Weimer
The Political Economy of Property Rights
Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies
Herausgeber: Weimer, David L.
Weimer
The Political Economy of Property Rights
Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies
Herausgeber: Weimer, David L.
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A 1997 investigation of the transformation of property rights in post-communist countries and China.
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A 1997 investigation of the transformation of property rights in post-communist countries and China.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 384
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. November 2010
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 622g
- ISBN-13: 9780521180702
- ISBN-10: 0521180708
- Artikelnr.: 32312246
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 384
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. November 2010
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 622g
- ISBN-13: 9780521180702
- ISBN-10: 0521180708
- Artikelnr.: 32312246
1. The political economy of property rights David L. Weimer; 2. Credible
commitment and property rights: the role of strategic interaction between
political and economic actors Daniel Diermeier, Joel Ericson, Timothy Frye,
and Steven Lewis; 3. The political commitment to markets and marketization:
comment on 'Credible commmitment and property rights' Barry R. Weingast; 4.
Political determinants of the success of economic transition Nikolai
Mikhailov; 5. Comment on 'Political determinants of the success of economic
transition' Adam Przeworski; 6. Russian privatization and the problem of
credible commitment Timothy Frye; 7. Three issues of credible commitment
and Russian privatization John M. Litwack; 8. Legislative politics and the
political economy of property rights in post-Communist Russia Brendan
Kiernan and Francis X. Bell; 9. Commitment, coordination, and the demise of
the post-Communist parliament in Russia Steven S. Smith; 10. Private firms,
city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St.
Petersburg Jole Meyer Ericson; 11. Comment on 'Private firms, city
governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St.
Petersburg' Anthony Jones; 12. Property rights and institutional change in
the Czech and Slovac Republics Mariusz Mark Dobek; 13. Comment on 'Property
rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics' Sharon
Wolchik; 14. Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving
privatization bargains in Poland Lorene Allio; 15. Comment on
'Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization
bargains in Poland' Bartlomeij Kaminski; 16. Privatization as institutional
change in Hungary László Urbán; 17. Comment on 'Privatization as
institutional change in Hungary' Kálmán Mizsei; 18. Marketization and
government credibility in Shanghai: federalist and local corporatist
explanations Steven Lewis; 19. Federalist and corporatist theories: a
comment on an empirical test Victor Nee; 20. Learning about the economy:
property rights and the collapse of the East German industrial economy
Hannes Wittig; 21. Misinformation, insecure property rights, and the
collapse of the East German economy Susanne Lohmann; 22. Post-Communist
privatization as a test of theories of institutional change Lorene Allio,
Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolia Mikhailov, and David L. Weimer; 23. Explaining
the complexity of institutional change Jack Knight and Douglass C. North.
commitment and property rights: the role of strategic interaction between
political and economic actors Daniel Diermeier, Joel Ericson, Timothy Frye,
and Steven Lewis; 3. The political commitment to markets and marketization:
comment on 'Credible commmitment and property rights' Barry R. Weingast; 4.
Political determinants of the success of economic transition Nikolai
Mikhailov; 5. Comment on 'Political determinants of the success of economic
transition' Adam Przeworski; 6. Russian privatization and the problem of
credible commitment Timothy Frye; 7. Three issues of credible commitment
and Russian privatization John M. Litwack; 8. Legislative politics and the
political economy of property rights in post-Communist Russia Brendan
Kiernan and Francis X. Bell; 9. Commitment, coordination, and the demise of
the post-Communist parliament in Russia Steven S. Smith; 10. Private firms,
city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St.
Petersburg Jole Meyer Ericson; 11. Comment on 'Private firms, city
governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St.
Petersburg' Anthony Jones; 12. Property rights and institutional change in
the Czech and Slovac Republics Mariusz Mark Dobek; 13. Comment on 'Property
rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics' Sharon
Wolchik; 14. Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving
privatization bargains in Poland Lorene Allio; 15. Comment on
'Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization
bargains in Poland' Bartlomeij Kaminski; 16. Privatization as institutional
change in Hungary László Urbán; 17. Comment on 'Privatization as
institutional change in Hungary' Kálmán Mizsei; 18. Marketization and
government credibility in Shanghai: federalist and local corporatist
explanations Steven Lewis; 19. Federalist and corporatist theories: a
comment on an empirical test Victor Nee; 20. Learning about the economy:
property rights and the collapse of the East German industrial economy
Hannes Wittig; 21. Misinformation, insecure property rights, and the
collapse of the East German economy Susanne Lohmann; 22. Post-Communist
privatization as a test of theories of institutional change Lorene Allio,
Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolia Mikhailov, and David L. Weimer; 23. Explaining
the complexity of institutional change Jack Knight and Douglass C. North.
1. The political economy of property rights David L. Weimer; 2. Credible
commitment and property rights: the role of strategic interaction between
political and economic actors Daniel Diermeier, Joel Ericson, Timothy Frye,
and Steven Lewis; 3. The political commitment to markets and marketization:
comment on 'Credible commmitment and property rights' Barry R. Weingast; 4.
Political determinants of the success of economic transition Nikolai
Mikhailov; 5. Comment on 'Political determinants of the success of economic
transition' Adam Przeworski; 6. Russian privatization and the problem of
credible commitment Timothy Frye; 7. Three issues of credible commitment
and Russian privatization John M. Litwack; 8. Legislative politics and the
political economy of property rights in post-Communist Russia Brendan
Kiernan and Francis X. Bell; 9. Commitment, coordination, and the demise of
the post-Communist parliament in Russia Steven S. Smith; 10. Private firms,
city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St.
Petersburg Jole Meyer Ericson; 11. Comment on 'Private firms, city
governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St.
Petersburg' Anthony Jones; 12. Property rights and institutional change in
the Czech and Slovac Republics Mariusz Mark Dobek; 13. Comment on 'Property
rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics' Sharon
Wolchik; 14. Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving
privatization bargains in Poland Lorene Allio; 15. Comment on
'Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization
bargains in Poland' Bartlomeij Kaminski; 16. Privatization as institutional
change in Hungary László Urbán; 17. Comment on 'Privatization as
institutional change in Hungary' Kálmán Mizsei; 18. Marketization and
government credibility in Shanghai: federalist and local corporatist
explanations Steven Lewis; 19. Federalist and corporatist theories: a
comment on an empirical test Victor Nee; 20. Learning about the economy:
property rights and the collapse of the East German industrial economy
Hannes Wittig; 21. Misinformation, insecure property rights, and the
collapse of the East German economy Susanne Lohmann; 22. Post-Communist
privatization as a test of theories of institutional change Lorene Allio,
Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolia Mikhailov, and David L. Weimer; 23. Explaining
the complexity of institutional change Jack Knight and Douglass C. North.
commitment and property rights: the role of strategic interaction between
political and economic actors Daniel Diermeier, Joel Ericson, Timothy Frye,
and Steven Lewis; 3. The political commitment to markets and marketization:
comment on 'Credible commmitment and property rights' Barry R. Weingast; 4.
Political determinants of the success of economic transition Nikolai
Mikhailov; 5. Comment on 'Political determinants of the success of economic
transition' Adam Przeworski; 6. Russian privatization and the problem of
credible commitment Timothy Frye; 7. Three issues of credible commitment
and Russian privatization John M. Litwack; 8. Legislative politics and the
political economy of property rights in post-Communist Russia Brendan
Kiernan and Francis X. Bell; 9. Commitment, coordination, and the demise of
the post-Communist parliament in Russia Steven S. Smith; 10. Private firms,
city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St.
Petersburg Jole Meyer Ericson; 11. Comment on 'Private firms, city
governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St.
Petersburg' Anthony Jones; 12. Property rights and institutional change in
the Czech and Slovac Republics Mariusz Mark Dobek; 13. Comment on 'Property
rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics' Sharon
Wolchik; 14. Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving
privatization bargains in Poland Lorene Allio; 15. Comment on
'Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization
bargains in Poland' Bartlomeij Kaminski; 16. Privatization as institutional
change in Hungary László Urbán; 17. Comment on 'Privatization as
institutional change in Hungary' Kálmán Mizsei; 18. Marketization and
government credibility in Shanghai: federalist and local corporatist
explanations Steven Lewis; 19. Federalist and corporatist theories: a
comment on an empirical test Victor Nee; 20. Learning about the economy:
property rights and the collapse of the East German industrial economy
Hannes Wittig; 21. Misinformation, insecure property rights, and the
collapse of the East German economy Susanne Lohmann; 22. Post-Communist
privatization as a test of theories of institutional change Lorene Allio,
Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolia Mikhailov, and David L. Weimer; 23. Explaining
the complexity of institutional change Jack Knight and Douglass C. North.