The Politics of Attracting Investment - Englund, Chase C.
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This book provides a tour through a novel theoretical approach to understanding the political economy of authoritarianism and the international market for capital investment. As the author demonstrates through an extensive series of analysis, success in attracting investment (and ultimately fostering growth) lies with the ability of the state to reduce investors' uncertainty. The author explores the market for FDI in nondemocratic states and finds that those states which feature reduced competition over policy between "economic elites" are more likely to attract investment inflows. However,…mehr

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Produktbeschreibung
This book provides a tour through a novel theoretical approach to understanding the political economy of authoritarianism and the international market for capital investment. As the author demonstrates through an extensive series of analysis, success in attracting investment (and ultimately fostering growth) lies with the ability of the state to reduce investors' uncertainty. The author explores the market for FDI in nondemocratic states and finds that those states which feature reduced competition over policy between "economic elites" are more likely to attract investment inflows. However, these inflows are the result of incentives provided as private benefits for incumbent elites, and tend to result in concentrated inflows. In Part II, this is contrasted with the way democratic states attract investment through institutional protections and public benefits. In this way, the author uncovers that authoritarian and democratic states achieve investor confidence through "alternate paths to predictability", one based on eliminating opposition through political consolidation and the other based on impartial rules and legal protections designed to constrain the excesses of political competition. The theory's central premise, that the concentration of economic influence with fewer "economic elites" is corrosive to political competition and institutional quality, carries huge significance for the study of both authoritarian and democratic governance quality.
Autorenporträt
Chase C. Englund is an economic policy analyst at the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve. His work in international political economy, the political economy of conflict, and the economics of regime type has appeared in the Economics of Peace and Security Journal, the Journal of International Logistics and Trade, the Journal of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, and a number of other professional publications. His dissertation work was focused on foreign direct investment in nondemocratic contexts, conducted at the University of Maryland and completed in 2023. He served as a Combat Engineer officer in the United States Army and was honorably discharged in 2024 at the rank of Captain after serving in Europe and the Middle East. Prior to his career in public policy, he worked in the financial industry. He lives in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania.