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Using a Rational Design approach, it explores five features of institutions and explains their variation.
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Using a Rational Design approach, it explores five features of institutions and explains their variation.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 356
- Erscheinungstermin: 21. Oktober 2011
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 19mm
- Gewicht: 516g
- ISBN-13: 9780521533584
- ISBN-10: 0521533589
- Artikelnr.: 20968958
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 356
- Erscheinungstermin: 21. Oktober 2011
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 19mm
- Gewicht: 516g
- ISBN-13: 9780521533584
- ISBN-10: 0521533589
- Artikelnr.: 20968958
1. The rational design of international institutions Barbara Koremenos et
al.; 2. Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement
Andrew Kydd; 3. The optimal design of international trade institutions:
uncertainty and escape B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner; 4.
Most-favored-nation clauses and cluster negotiations Robert Pahre; 5.
Situation structure and institutional design: reciprocity, coercion, and
exchange Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach; 6. Private justice in
a global economy: from litigation to arbitration Walter Mattli; 7.
Multilateralizing trade and payments in postwar Europe Thomas H. Oatley; 8.
The institutional features of the Prisoners of War Treaties James D.
Morrow; 9. Institutions for flying: how states built a market in
international aviation service John E. Richards; 10. Driving with the
rearview mirror: on the rational science of institutional design Alexander
Wendt; 11. Rational design: looking back to move forward Barbara Koremenos
et al.
al.; 2. Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement
Andrew Kydd; 3. The optimal design of international trade institutions:
uncertainty and escape B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner; 4.
Most-favored-nation clauses and cluster negotiations Robert Pahre; 5.
Situation structure and institutional design: reciprocity, coercion, and
exchange Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach; 6. Private justice in
a global economy: from litigation to arbitration Walter Mattli; 7.
Multilateralizing trade and payments in postwar Europe Thomas H. Oatley; 8.
The institutional features of the Prisoners of War Treaties James D.
Morrow; 9. Institutions for flying: how states built a market in
international aviation service John E. Richards; 10. Driving with the
rearview mirror: on the rational science of institutional design Alexander
Wendt; 11. Rational design: looking back to move forward Barbara Koremenos
et al.
1. The rational design of international institutions Barbara Koremenos et
al.; 2. Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement
Andrew Kydd; 3. The optimal design of international trade institutions:
uncertainty and escape B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner; 4.
Most-favored-nation clauses and cluster negotiations Robert Pahre; 5.
Situation structure and institutional design: reciprocity, coercion, and
exchange Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach; 6. Private justice in
a global economy: from litigation to arbitration Walter Mattli; 7.
Multilateralizing trade and payments in postwar Europe Thomas H. Oatley; 8.
The institutional features of the Prisoners of War Treaties James D.
Morrow; 9. Institutions for flying: how states built a market in
international aviation service John E. Richards; 10. Driving with the
rearview mirror: on the rational science of institutional design Alexander
Wendt; 11. Rational design: looking back to move forward Barbara Koremenos
et al.
al.; 2. Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement
Andrew Kydd; 3. The optimal design of international trade institutions:
uncertainty and escape B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner; 4.
Most-favored-nation clauses and cluster negotiations Robert Pahre; 5.
Situation structure and institutional design: reciprocity, coercion, and
exchange Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach; 6. Private justice in
a global economy: from litigation to arbitration Walter Mattli; 7.
Multilateralizing trade and payments in postwar Europe Thomas H. Oatley; 8.
The institutional features of the Prisoners of War Treaties James D.
Morrow; 9. Institutions for flying: how states built a market in
international aviation service John E. Richards; 10. Driving with the
rearview mirror: on the rational science of institutional design Alexander
Wendt; 11. Rational design: looking back to move forward Barbara Koremenos
et al.