1. The rational design of international institutions Barbara Koremenos et
al.; 2. Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement
Andrew Kydd; 3. The optimal design of international trade institutions:
uncertainty and escape B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner; 4.
Most-favored-nation clauses and cluster negotiations Robert Pahre; 5.
Situation structure and institutional design: reciprocity, coercion, and
exchange Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach; 6. Private justice in
a global economy: from litigation to arbitration Walter Mattli; 7.
Multilateralizing trade and payments in postwar Europe Thomas H. Oatley; 8.
The institutional features of the Prisoners of War Treaties James D.
Morrow; 9. Institutions for flying: how states built a market in
international aviation service John E. Richards; 10. Driving with the
rearview mirror: on the rational science of institutional design Alexander
Wendt; 11. Rational design: looking back to move forward Barbara Koremenos
et al.
