The Role of Disclosure in Motiving Top Executives - Qi, Qianru Cheryl
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Only 30% of companies have a board-approved CEO succession plan evaluated by the directors periodically before 2009, according to many recent surveys and firms' proxy statements. Using a new database of 10,835 CEOs and hand-collected information of succession plans, in conjunction with two regulatory changes and differences-in-differences identification strategy, we present evidence that better corporate governance instigate firms to adopt succession plans, which causes significant reduction of the incumbent CEOs' entrenchment and improvement of the incoming CEOs' quality. A value-weighted…mehr

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Produktbeschreibung
Only 30% of companies have a board-approved CEO succession plan evaluated by the directors periodically before 2009, according to many recent surveys and firms' proxy statements. Using a new database of 10,835 CEOs and hand-collected information of succession plans, in conjunction with two regulatory changes and differences-in-differences identification strategy, we present evidence that better corporate governance instigate firms to adopt succession plans, which causes significant reduction of the incumbent CEOs' entrenchment and improvement of the incoming CEOs' quality. A value-weighted portfolio of the firms disclosing CEO succession plans earned an annual three-factor alpha of 2.7% from 1998-2013, and 14% after 2009.
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Autorenporträt
Dr. Qianru Qi is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Fudan University, Shanghai. Her main research area is Corporate Finance and Entrepreneurship. Her research has been partially supported by grants from the Ministry of Science and Technology of China, National Science Foundation of China, the Ministry of Education of China, Shanghai Government.