Provides an investigation into the mechanisms by which governments in different countries determine the agendas of their corresponding parliaments. This book explores the three different ways that governments can shape legislative outcomes: institutional, partisan and positional, to make an important contribution to legislative politics. With a strong comparative framework, this book examines fourteen countries with parliamentary or semi-presidential systems of government to provide a detailed investigation into the mechanisms by which governments determine the agendas of their parliaments.
Provides an investigation into the mechanisms by which governments in different countries determine the agendas of their corresponding parliaments. This book explores the three different ways that governments can shape legislative outcomes: institutional, partisan and positional, to make an important contribution to legislative politics.With a strong comparative framework, this book examines fourteen countries with parliamentary or semi-presidential systems of government to provide a detailed investigation into the mechanisms by which governments determine the agendas of their parliaments.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
George Tsebelis is Anatol Rapoport Collegiate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. He is the author of numerous articles on political institutions. His articles have appeared in professional Journals as American Political Science Review, British Journal of Political Science, Rationality and Society and Journal of Theoretical Politics. He is the author of "Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics" (University of California Press, 1990), Bicameralism (with Jeanette Money; Cambridge University Press, 1997), and Veto Players (Princeton University Press, 2002). Bjørn Erik Rasch, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. He has written numerous articles on parliaments, and has published nine books (in Norwegian). The most recent one studies parliamentary government and constitutional reforms (Kampen om regjeringsmakten, Fagbokforlaget 2004). His English language articles have appeared journals as Legislative Studies Quarterly, Public Choice, European Journal of Political Economy and Scandinavian Political Studies. Rasch was member of a Constitutional Commission appointed by the Norwegian parliament in late 2003 to review and modernize the Court of Impeachment. He also was member of a committee who designed a new electoral system for the Sami Parliament in Northern Norway. From 2005 Rasch has headed and coordinated the study programs in political science at the University of Oslo.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Governments and Legislative Agenda Setting: An Introduction George Tsebelis and Bjørn Erik Rasch 2. Germany: Limited Government Agenda Control and Strong Minority Rights Christoph Hönnige and Ulrich Sieberer 3. France: Systematic Institutional Advantage of Government Sylvain Brouard 4. Italy: Government Alternation and Legislative Agenda Setting Francesco Zucchini 5. United Kingdom: Extreme Dominance by the Executive... Most of the Time Mads Qvortrup 6. Hungary: Changing Government Advantages-Challenging a Dominant Executive Gabriella Ilonszki and Krisztina Jáger 7. Netherlands: Legislative Agenda Setting and the Politics of Strategic Lock-Ins Arco Timmermans 8. Switzerland: Agenda-Setting Power of Government in a Separation-of-Powers Framework Daniel Schwarz, André Bächtiger and Georg Lutz 9. Greece: Government as the Dominant Player Aris Alexopoulos 10 Spain: Majoritarian Choices, Disciplined Party Government and Compliant Legislature Natalia Ajenjo and Ignatio Molina 11. Portugal: Active and Influential Parliament Eugenia da Conceição-Heldt 12. Russia: The Executive in a Leading Role Iulia Shevchenko and Grigorii Golosov 13. Agenda Control and Veto Rights to Opposition Parties Robert Klemmensen 14. Norway: Institutionally Weak Governments and Parliamentary Voting on Bills Bjørn Erik Rasch 15. Japan: Decades of Partisan Advantages Impending Cabinet's Agenda Setting Power Silke Riemann 16.Conclusion Bjørn Erik Rasch and George Tsebelis
1. Governments and Legislative Agenda Setting: An Introduction George Tsebelis and Bjørn Erik Rasch 2. Germany: Limited Government Agenda Control and Strong Minority Rights Christoph Hönnige and Ulrich Sieberer 3. France: Systematic Institutional Advantage of Government Sylvain Brouard 4. Italy: Government Alternation and Legislative Agenda Setting Francesco Zucchini 5. United Kingdom: Extreme Dominance by the Executive... Most of the Time Mads Qvortrup 6. Hungary: Changing Government Advantages-Challenging a Dominant Executive Gabriella Ilonszki and Krisztina Jáger 7. Netherlands: Legislative Agenda Setting and the Politics of Strategic Lock-Ins Arco Timmermans 8. Switzerland: Agenda-Setting Power of Government in a Separation-of-Powers Framework Daniel Schwarz, André Bächtiger and Georg Lutz 9. Greece: Government as the Dominant Player Aris Alexopoulos 10 Spain: Majoritarian Choices, Disciplined Party Government and Compliant Legislature Natalia Ajenjo and Ignatio Molina 11. Portugal: Active and Influential Parliament Eugenia da Conceição-Heldt 12. Russia: The Executive in a Leading Role Iulia Shevchenko and Grigorii Golosov 13. Agenda Control and Veto Rights to Opposition Parties Robert Klemmensen 14. Norway: Institutionally Weak Governments and Parliamentary Voting on Bills Bjørn Erik Rasch 15. Japan: Decades of Partisan Advantages Impending Cabinet's Agenda Setting Power Silke Riemann 16.Conclusion Bjørn Erik Rasch and George Tsebelis
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826