The Routledge Handbook of Propositions
Herausgeber: Tillman, Chris; Murray, Adam
The Routledge Handbook of Propositions
Herausgeber: Tillman, Chris; Murray, Adam
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Provides a comprehensive overview of the philosophy of propositions, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Comprising 33 original chapters by an international team of scholars, the volume addresses both traditional and emerging questions concerning the nature of propositions.
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Provides a comprehensive overview of the philosophy of propositions, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Comprising 33 original chapters by an international team of scholars, the volume addresses both traditional and emerging questions concerning the nature of propositions.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Jenny Stanford Publishing
- Seitenzahl: 554
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. September 2022
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 254mm x 178mm x 32mm
- Gewicht: 1197g
- ISBN-13: 9781138282940
- ISBN-10: 1138282944
- Artikelnr.: 59999180
- Verlag: Jenny Stanford Publishing
- Seitenzahl: 554
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. September 2022
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 254mm x 178mm x 32mm
- Gewicht: 1197g
- ISBN-13: 9781138282940
- ISBN-10: 1138282944
- Artikelnr.: 59999180
Adam Russell Murray is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba. He works primarily in metaphysics and the philosophy of language. Chris Tillman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba. His research interests include metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of art.
Introduction Part I: Foundational Issues in the Theory of Propositions 1.
The Linguistic Basis for Propositions 2. Propositions, Posits, and States
of Affairs 3. Instrumentalism about Structured Propositions Part II:
Historical Theories of Propositions 4. Ancient Theories of Propositions 5.
Medieval Theories of Propositions: Ockham and the Later Medieval Debate 6.
Lockean Propositions 7. Kant, Propositions, and Non-Fundamental Metaphysics
8. Bolzano's Theory of Satz an sich 9. Frege on Thoughts 10. Russell on
Propositions Part III: Contemporary Theories and Further Issues 11.
Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities 12. Truthmaker Accounts
of Propositions 13. Syntactically Structured Propositions 14. Propositions
as Interpreted Abstracta 15. The View of Propositions as Types of Actions
16. Cognitive Propositions: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Empirical
Adequacy 17. Propositions as Cambridge Properties 18. Why 0-Adic Relations
Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian
Propositions 19. Propositions without Parts 20. Hylomorphic Propositions
21. Temporal Propositions and Our Attitudes toward the Past and the Future
22. Frege's Other Puzzle: Relativity in Propositional Content 23.
Propositions and Attitudes De Se 24. Propositional Dependence and
Perspectival Shift 25. Attitudinal Objects and Propositions 26.
Propositions as Objects of the Attitudes 27. The Varieties of Gappy
Propositions 28. Plenitudinous Russellianism 29. Semantic Relationism 30.
Propositions and Questions 31. The Propositional Benacerraf Problem 32.
Reference, Propositions, and the World 33. Propositional Paradox
The Linguistic Basis for Propositions 2. Propositions, Posits, and States
of Affairs 3. Instrumentalism about Structured Propositions Part II:
Historical Theories of Propositions 4. Ancient Theories of Propositions 5.
Medieval Theories of Propositions: Ockham and the Later Medieval Debate 6.
Lockean Propositions 7. Kant, Propositions, and Non-Fundamental Metaphysics
8. Bolzano's Theory of Satz an sich 9. Frege on Thoughts 10. Russell on
Propositions Part III: Contemporary Theories and Further Issues 11.
Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities 12. Truthmaker Accounts
of Propositions 13. Syntactically Structured Propositions 14. Propositions
as Interpreted Abstracta 15. The View of Propositions as Types of Actions
16. Cognitive Propositions: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Empirical
Adequacy 17. Propositions as Cambridge Properties 18. Why 0-Adic Relations
Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian
Propositions 19. Propositions without Parts 20. Hylomorphic Propositions
21. Temporal Propositions and Our Attitudes toward the Past and the Future
22. Frege's Other Puzzle: Relativity in Propositional Content 23.
Propositions and Attitudes De Se 24. Propositional Dependence and
Perspectival Shift 25. Attitudinal Objects and Propositions 26.
Propositions as Objects of the Attitudes 27. The Varieties of Gappy
Propositions 28. Plenitudinous Russellianism 29. Semantic Relationism 30.
Propositions and Questions 31. The Propositional Benacerraf Problem 32.
Reference, Propositions, and the World 33. Propositional Paradox
Introduction Part I: Foundational Issues in the Theory of Propositions 1.
The Linguistic Basis for Propositions 2. Propositions, Posits, and States
of Affairs 3. Instrumentalism about Structured Propositions Part II:
Historical Theories of Propositions 4. Ancient Theories of Propositions 5.
Medieval Theories of Propositions: Ockham and the Later Medieval Debate 6.
Lockean Propositions 7. Kant, Propositions, and Non-Fundamental Metaphysics
8. Bolzano's Theory of Satz an sich 9. Frege on Thoughts 10. Russell on
Propositions Part III: Contemporary Theories and Further Issues 11.
Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities 12. Truthmaker Accounts
of Propositions 13. Syntactically Structured Propositions 14. Propositions
as Interpreted Abstracta 15. The View of Propositions as Types of Actions
16. Cognitive Propositions: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Empirical
Adequacy 17. Propositions as Cambridge Properties 18. Why 0-Adic Relations
Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian
Propositions 19. Propositions without Parts 20. Hylomorphic Propositions
21. Temporal Propositions and Our Attitudes toward the Past and the Future
22. Frege's Other Puzzle: Relativity in Propositional Content 23.
Propositions and Attitudes De Se 24. Propositional Dependence and
Perspectival Shift 25. Attitudinal Objects and Propositions 26.
Propositions as Objects of the Attitudes 27. The Varieties of Gappy
Propositions 28. Plenitudinous Russellianism 29. Semantic Relationism 30.
Propositions and Questions 31. The Propositional Benacerraf Problem 32.
Reference, Propositions, and the World 33. Propositional Paradox
The Linguistic Basis for Propositions 2. Propositions, Posits, and States
of Affairs 3. Instrumentalism about Structured Propositions Part II:
Historical Theories of Propositions 4. Ancient Theories of Propositions 5.
Medieval Theories of Propositions: Ockham and the Later Medieval Debate 6.
Lockean Propositions 7. Kant, Propositions, and Non-Fundamental Metaphysics
8. Bolzano's Theory of Satz an sich 9. Frege on Thoughts 10. Russell on
Propositions Part III: Contemporary Theories and Further Issues 11.
Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities 12. Truthmaker Accounts
of Propositions 13. Syntactically Structured Propositions 14. Propositions
as Interpreted Abstracta 15. The View of Propositions as Types of Actions
16. Cognitive Propositions: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Empirical
Adequacy 17. Propositions as Cambridge Properties 18. Why 0-Adic Relations
Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian
Propositions 19. Propositions without Parts 20. Hylomorphic Propositions
21. Temporal Propositions and Our Attitudes toward the Past and the Future
22. Frege's Other Puzzle: Relativity in Propositional Content 23.
Propositions and Attitudes De Se 24. Propositional Dependence and
Perspectival Shift 25. Attitudinal Objects and Propositions 26.
Propositions as Objects of the Attitudes 27. The Varieties of Gappy
Propositions 28. Plenitudinous Russellianism 29. Semantic Relationism 30.
Propositions and Questions 31. The Propositional Benacerraf Problem 32.
Reference, Propositions, and the World 33. Propositional Paradox