Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.
Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia; he did his graduate work at Brown University and Rutgers University and post-doctoral work at the Arché Research Centre in St Andrews. He works primarily in epistemology and philosophical methodology; he has written papers on dreaming, imagination, knowledge and knowledge attributions, intuitions, and experimental philosophy. ; Benjamin W. Jarvis received his PhD in philosophy from Brown University in 2010, taking up a permanent lectureship in philosophy at Queen's University Belfast that same year. He works primarily in epistemology and the philosophy of mind and cognitive science and has published papers on belief, mental representation, knowledge, and truth.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction: Objective Rules of Thought Part I: Propositions, Fregean Sense, and Rational Modality 1: A Fregean Theory of Propositional Attitudes 2: A Theory of Rational Modality 3: The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense 4: The Sociability of a Fregean Theory 5: Fregean Sense First Part II: Rationality, Apriority, and Philosophy 6: A Theory of the A Priori 7: A Priori Philosophy: Responses to Objections 8: The Content of Thought-Experiment Judgments 9: The Epistemology of Thought-Experiment Judgments 10: Rational Imagination and Modal Epistemology Appendix A: The misidentification response Appendix B: Natural kinds Part III: Intuitions and Philosophy 11: The Nature of Intuitions 12: Against Strong Experiential Rationalism 13: Intuition as a Source of Evidence? 14: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology References Index
Introduction: Objective Rules of Thought Part I: Propositions, Fregean Sense, and Rational Modality 1: A Fregean Theory of Propositional Attitudes 2: A Theory of Rational Modality 3: The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense 4: The Sociability of a Fregean Theory 5: Fregean Sense First Part II: Rationality, Apriority, and Philosophy 6: A Theory of the A Priori 7: A Priori Philosophy: Responses to Objections 8: The Content of Thought-Experiment Judgments 9: The Epistemology of Thought-Experiment Judgments 10: Rational Imagination and Modal Epistemology Appendix A: The misidentification response Appendix B: Natural kinds Part III: Intuitions and Philosophy 11: The Nature of Intuitions 12: Against Strong Experiential Rationalism 13: Intuition as a Source of Evidence? 14: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology References Index
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