This 1999 argues that, paradoxically, countries are likely to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
1. Introduction Part I. Theory and Data: 2. A model of economic coercion 3. Plausibility probes 4. Statistical tests Part II. Economic Coercion in the Former Soviet Union: 5. Russian power and preferences 6. The extent of NIS concessions 7. Evaluating the evidence Part III. Choosing Between Carrots and Sticks: 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations.
1. Introduction Part I. Theory and Data: 2. A model of economic coercion 3. Plausibility probes 4. Statistical tests Part II. Economic Coercion in the Former Soviet Union: 5. Russian power and preferences 6. The extent of NIS concessions 7. Evaluating the evidence Part III. Choosing Between Carrots and Sticks: 8. Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula 9. Conclusions, implications, speculations.
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