This book offers a critical overview of the current debate on the semantics of knowledge attributions. It examines the main principles underlying the various approaches to the topic and outlines how they aim to explain the pertinent data and resolve philosophical puzzles and challenges.
This book offers a critical overview of the current debate on the semantics of knowledge attributions. It examines the main principles underlying the various approaches to the topic and outlines how they aim to explain the pertinent data and resolve philosophical puzzles and challenges.
Michael Blome-Tillmann is Associate Professor of Philosophy at McGill University. He received his DPhil from the University of Oxford in 2007. His research is primarily in epistemology and the philosophy of language broadly construed. He is the author of Knowledge and Presuppositions (OUP 2014).
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction Part I: Epistemic Contextualism 1: Epistemic Contextualism 2: Semantic Implementations 3: Versions of Contextualism 4: Linguistic Objections 5: Philosophical Objections Part II: Epistemic Impurism 6: Epistemic Impurism 7: Problems and Objections Part III: Epistemic Relativism 8: Epistemic Relativism Part IV: Strict Invariantism 9: Psychological Invariantism 10: Pragmatic Invariantism Part V: Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism 11: The Presupposition Effect 12: Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism References
