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This volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper.
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This volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 340
- Erscheinungstermin: 20. Oktober 2005
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 553g
- ISBN-13: 9780521021333
- ISBN-10: 0521021332
- Artikelnr.: 22180416
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 340
- Erscheinungstermin: 20. Oktober 2005
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 553g
- ISBN-13: 9780521021333
- ISBN-10: 0521021332
- Artikelnr.: 22180416
Preface; 1. Introduction to the Shapley value Alvin E. Roth; Part I.
Ancestral Papers: 2. A value for n-person games Lloyd S. Shapley; 3. A
method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system Lloyd
S. Shapley and Martin Shubik; Part II. Reformulation and Generalizations:
4. The expected utility of playing a game Alvin E. Roth; 5. The
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities Philip D.
Straffin, Jr.; 6. Weighted Shapley values Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet; 7.
Probabilistic values for games Robert James Weber; 8. Combinatorial
representations of the Shapley value based on average relative payoffs
Uriel G. Rothblum; 9. The potential of the Shapley value Sergiu Hart and
Andreu Mas-Colell; 10. Multilinear extensions of games Guillermo Owen; Part
III. Coalitions: 11. Coalitional value Mordecai Kurz; 12. Endogenous
formation of links between players and the coalitions: an application of
the Shapley value Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson; Part IV. Large
Games: 13. Values of large finite games Myrna Holtz Wooders and William R.
Zame; 14. Payoffs in nonatomic economics: an axiomatic approach Pradeep
Dubley and Abraham Neyman; 15. Values of smooth nonatomic games: the method
of multilinear approximation Dov Monderer and Abraham Neyman; 16.
Nondifferentiable TU markets: the value Jean-François Mertens; Part V. Cost
Allocation and Fair Division: 17. Individual contribution and just
compensation H. P. Young; 18. The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey Yair
Tauman; Part VI. NTU Games: 19. Utility comparison and the theory of games
Lloyd S. Shapley; 20. Paths leading to the Nash set Michael Maschler,
Guillermo Owen and Bezalel Peleg.
Ancestral Papers: 2. A value for n-person games Lloyd S. Shapley; 3. A
method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system Lloyd
S. Shapley and Martin Shubik; Part II. Reformulation and Generalizations:
4. The expected utility of playing a game Alvin E. Roth; 5. The
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities Philip D.
Straffin, Jr.; 6. Weighted Shapley values Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet; 7.
Probabilistic values for games Robert James Weber; 8. Combinatorial
representations of the Shapley value based on average relative payoffs
Uriel G. Rothblum; 9. The potential of the Shapley value Sergiu Hart and
Andreu Mas-Colell; 10. Multilinear extensions of games Guillermo Owen; Part
III. Coalitions: 11. Coalitional value Mordecai Kurz; 12. Endogenous
formation of links between players and the coalitions: an application of
the Shapley value Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson; Part IV. Large
Games: 13. Values of large finite games Myrna Holtz Wooders and William R.
Zame; 14. Payoffs in nonatomic economics: an axiomatic approach Pradeep
Dubley and Abraham Neyman; 15. Values of smooth nonatomic games: the method
of multilinear approximation Dov Monderer and Abraham Neyman; 16.
Nondifferentiable TU markets: the value Jean-François Mertens; Part V. Cost
Allocation and Fair Division: 17. Individual contribution and just
compensation H. P. Young; 18. The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey Yair
Tauman; Part VI. NTU Games: 19. Utility comparison and the theory of games
Lloyd S. Shapley; 20. Paths leading to the Nash set Michael Maschler,
Guillermo Owen and Bezalel Peleg.
Preface; 1. Introduction to the Shapley value Alvin E. Roth; Part I.
Ancestral Papers: 2. A value for n-person games Lloyd S. Shapley; 3. A
method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system Lloyd
S. Shapley and Martin Shubik; Part II. Reformulation and Generalizations:
4. The expected utility of playing a game Alvin E. Roth; 5. The
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities Philip D.
Straffin, Jr.; 6. Weighted Shapley values Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet; 7.
Probabilistic values for games Robert James Weber; 8. Combinatorial
representations of the Shapley value based on average relative payoffs
Uriel G. Rothblum; 9. The potential of the Shapley value Sergiu Hart and
Andreu Mas-Colell; 10. Multilinear extensions of games Guillermo Owen; Part
III. Coalitions: 11. Coalitional value Mordecai Kurz; 12. Endogenous
formation of links between players and the coalitions: an application of
the Shapley value Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson; Part IV. Large
Games: 13. Values of large finite games Myrna Holtz Wooders and William R.
Zame; 14. Payoffs in nonatomic economics: an axiomatic approach Pradeep
Dubley and Abraham Neyman; 15. Values of smooth nonatomic games: the method
of multilinear approximation Dov Monderer and Abraham Neyman; 16.
Nondifferentiable TU markets: the value Jean-François Mertens; Part V. Cost
Allocation and Fair Division: 17. Individual contribution and just
compensation H. P. Young; 18. The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey Yair
Tauman; Part VI. NTU Games: 19. Utility comparison and the theory of games
Lloyd S. Shapley; 20. Paths leading to the Nash set Michael Maschler,
Guillermo Owen and Bezalel Peleg.
Ancestral Papers: 2. A value for n-person games Lloyd S. Shapley; 3. A
method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system Lloyd
S. Shapley and Martin Shubik; Part II. Reformulation and Generalizations:
4. The expected utility of playing a game Alvin E. Roth; 5. The
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities Philip D.
Straffin, Jr.; 6. Weighted Shapley values Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet; 7.
Probabilistic values for games Robert James Weber; 8. Combinatorial
representations of the Shapley value based on average relative payoffs
Uriel G. Rothblum; 9. The potential of the Shapley value Sergiu Hart and
Andreu Mas-Colell; 10. Multilinear extensions of games Guillermo Owen; Part
III. Coalitions: 11. Coalitional value Mordecai Kurz; 12. Endogenous
formation of links between players and the coalitions: an application of
the Shapley value Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson; Part IV. Large
Games: 13. Values of large finite games Myrna Holtz Wooders and William R.
Zame; 14. Payoffs in nonatomic economics: an axiomatic approach Pradeep
Dubley and Abraham Neyman; 15. Values of smooth nonatomic games: the method
of multilinear approximation Dov Monderer and Abraham Neyman; 16.
Nondifferentiable TU markets: the value Jean-François Mertens; Part V. Cost
Allocation and Fair Division: 17. Individual contribution and just
compensation H. P. Young; 18. The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey Yair
Tauman; Part VI. NTU Games: 19. Utility comparison and the theory of games
Lloyd S. Shapley; 20. Paths leading to the Nash set Michael Maschler,
Guillermo Owen and Bezalel Peleg.