This book reconceives virtue epistemology in light of the conviction that we are essentially social creatures. Green's account is based on the extended credit view, which conceives of knowledge as an achievement and broadens that focus to include team achievements in addition to individual ones.
This book reconceives virtue epistemology in light of the conviction that we are essentially social creatures. Green's account is based on the extended credit view, which conceives of knowledge as an achievement and broadens that focus to include team achievements in addition to individual ones.
Adam Green is an assistant professor of philosophy at Azusa Pacific University. His work ranges over epistemology, the philosophy and cognitive science of religion, and philosophical psychology. His previous work on social epistemology has appeared in American Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, Episteme, and Philosophical Explorations.
Inhaltsangabe
1. The Basic Challenge and Basic View 2. Role-Based Normativity 3. Empirical Challenges for Testimony 4. Situationism, Heuristics, and a Broader Empirical Challenge 5. Kinds of Credit 6. The Ability Condition 7. Socially Distributed Cognition 8. Authority and Injustice 9. When Social Creatures Disagree Conclusion Appendix --Environmental Luck
1. The Basic Challenge and Basic View 2. Role-Based Normativity 3. Empirical Challenges for Testimony 4. Situationism, Heuristics, and a Broader Empirical Challenge 5. Kinds of Credit 6. The Ability Condition 7. Socially Distributed Cognition 8. Authority and Injustice 9. When Social Creatures Disagree Conclusion Appendix --Environmental Luck
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