What do paintings, thoughts, words, desires, photographs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness that some items exhibit while others do not.
What do paintings, thoughts, words, desires, photographs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness that some items exhibit while others do not.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Uriah Kriegel is Research Director at the Jean Nicod Institute (CNRS). His work centers on consciousness and intentionality. He is also the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (2009) and Phenomenal Intentionality (2013), both from Oxford University Press.
Inhaltsangabe
* Contents * Introduction * 1. The Experiential Origins of Intentionality * 1.1. The Concept of Intentionality and Anchoring Instances * 1.1.1. An Anchoring-Instance Model of Natural Kind Concept Formation * 1.1.2. Application to the Concept of Intentionality * 1.2. Experiential Intentionality the Anchor * 1.2.1. An Asymmetry of Ascription * 1.2.2. Explaining the Asymmetry * 1.2.3. Objections and Replies * 1.3. 'Experiential Intentionality' * 1.3.1. Definition * 1.3.2. Existence * 1.3.3. Scope * 2. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: I. A Higher-Order Tracking Theory * 2.1. A Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality? * 2.1.1. Background: Tracking Theories of Mental Representation * 2.1.2. Representationalist Theories of Conscious Experience * 2.1.3. Experiential Tracking * 2.2. The HOT Argument * 2.2.1. Background: Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Experience * 2.2.2. Higher-Order Theory and the Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality * 2.3. Experiential Intentionality and Higher-Order Tracking * 2.4. Objections and Replies * 2.4.1. 'Intentionality,' 'Representation,' 'Tracking' * 2.4.2. What do We Want a Theory of Intentionality for? * 3. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: II. An Adverbial Theory * 3.1. Background: Intentional Inexistence and Intentional Indifference * 3.2. The Argument from Intentional Indifference * 3.2.1. The Argument * 3.2.2. Responses * 3.2.3. Brains in Vats * 3.3. The Argument from Intentional Inexistence * 3.3.1. The Argument * 3.3.2. Responses * 3.4. Experiential Intentionality as Adverbial Modification * 3.5. Objections to Adverbialism * 4. The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory * 4.1. Potentialism * 4.2. Inferentialism * 4.3. Eliminativism * 4.4. Interpretivism * 4.4.1. Interpretivism about Non-Experiential Intentionality * 4.4.2. Interpretivism Developed * 4.4.3. Objections and Replies * 5. Toward a General Theory of Intentionality * 5.1. Adverbialism plus Interpretivism * 5.2. Higher-Order Tracking Theory plus Interpretivism * References
* Contents * Introduction * 1. The Experiential Origins of Intentionality * 1.1. The Concept of Intentionality and Anchoring Instances * 1.1.1. An Anchoring-Instance Model of Natural Kind Concept Formation * 1.1.2. Application to the Concept of Intentionality * 1.2. Experiential Intentionality the Anchor * 1.2.1. An Asymmetry of Ascription * 1.2.2. Explaining the Asymmetry * 1.2.3. Objections and Replies * 1.3. 'Experiential Intentionality' * 1.3.1. Definition * 1.3.2. Existence * 1.3.3. Scope * 2. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: I. A Higher-Order Tracking Theory * 2.1. A Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality? * 2.1.1. Background: Tracking Theories of Mental Representation * 2.1.2. Representationalist Theories of Conscious Experience * 2.1.3. Experiential Tracking * 2.2. The HOT Argument * 2.2.1. Background: Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Experience * 2.2.2. Higher-Order Theory and the Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality * 2.3. Experiential Intentionality and Higher-Order Tracking * 2.4. Objections and Replies * 2.4.1. 'Intentionality,' 'Representation,' 'Tracking' * 2.4.2. What do We Want a Theory of Intentionality for? * 3. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: II. An Adverbial Theory * 3.1. Background: Intentional Inexistence and Intentional Indifference * 3.2. The Argument from Intentional Indifference * 3.2.1. The Argument * 3.2.2. Responses * 3.2.3. Brains in Vats * 3.3. The Argument from Intentional Inexistence * 3.3.1. The Argument * 3.3.2. Responses * 3.4. Experiential Intentionality as Adverbial Modification * 3.5. Objections to Adverbialism * 4. The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory * 4.1. Potentialism * 4.2. Inferentialism * 4.3. Eliminativism * 4.4. Interpretivism * 4.4.1. Interpretivism about Non-Experiential Intentionality * 4.4.2. Interpretivism Developed * 4.4.3. Objections and Replies * 5. Toward a General Theory of Intentionality * 5.1. Adverbialism plus Interpretivism * 5.2. Higher-Order Tracking Theory plus Interpretivism * References
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