This book examines how the two most important Western Allies in World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom, assessed the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union in 1939-1945. Utilising a wide range of documents produced by the Anglo-Americans during and shortly before World War II, the book explores why Soviet strength was underestimated, and how the Soviet economic system, Soviet society and military capabilities were viewed by Western Government observers.
This book examines how the two most important Western Allies in World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom, assessed the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union in 1939-1945. Utilising a wide range of documents produced by the Anglo-Americans during and shortly before World War II, the book explores why Soviet strength was underestimated, and how the Soviet economic system, Soviet society and military capabilities were viewed by Western Government observers.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Martin Kahn is a Swedish economic historian. He is a docent (associate professor) affiliated with the Department of Economy and Society at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
Inhaltsangabe
Abbreviations 1 Introduction 1.1 General background 1.2 War potential and the general purpose of this study 2 The Anglo-American assessments in a wider context 2.1 The US and British government organizations responsible for assessing the USSR 2.2 The origins, analysis and dissemination of information 2.3 The assessment's reliability and the selection of reports for this study 2.4 The reality and contemporary perceptions of war potential 3 The Soviet Union and the West: The pre-war experience and international Great Power politics before World War II 4 From the guarantee to Poland to the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact 4.1 British anguish: The value of the Soviet Union as an ally and the gathering storm in Europe 4.2 Soviet war potential and the possible inclusion of the USSR in a peace front 4.3 The Soviets propose an alliance4.4 Assessments on the eve of the Moscow negotiations 5 US pre-Barbarossa assessments 5.1 The economy and its military potential 5.2 The size and efficiency of the armed forces 5.3 Internal stability 6 The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences 6.1 The Polish campaign 6.2 The USSR as a potential military adversary 6.3 The Red Army enter Estonia 6.4 Assessments regarding the economy during the autumn 6.5 Soviet air strength - autumn assessments 6.6 Assessments connected to the Soviet-Japanese conflict 6.7 Anglo-French plans to interdict the Soviet oil supply 7 The Soviet-Finnish Winter War 7.1 The Red Army's performance 7.2 The economy and the internal situation 8 Assessments running up to Barbarossa 8.1 The economy and internal stability 8.2 The production and quality of munitions 8.3 Milita
Abbreviations 1 Introduction 1.1 General background 1.2 War potential and the general purpose of this study 2 The Anglo-American assessments in a wider context 2.1 The US and British government organizations responsible for assessing the USSR 2.2 The origins, analysis and dissemination of information 2.3 The assessment's reliability and the selection of reports for this study 2.4 The reality and contemporary perceptions of war potential 3 The Soviet Union and the West: The pre-war experience and international Great Power politics before World War II 4 From the guarantee to Poland to the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact 4.1 British anguish: The value of the Soviet Union as an ally and the gathering storm in Europe 4.2 Soviet war potential and the possible inclusion of the USSR in a peace front 4.3 The Soviets propose an alliance4.4 Assessments on the eve of the Moscow negotiations 5 US pre-Barbarossa assessments 5.1 The economy and its military potential 5.2 The size and efficiency of the armed forces 5.3 Internal stability 6 The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences 6.1 The Polish campaign 6.2 The USSR as a potential military adversary 6.3 The Red Army enter Estonia 6.4 Assessments regarding the economy during the autumn 6.5 Soviet air strength - autumn assessments 6.6 Assessments connected to the Soviet-Japanese conflict 6.7 Anglo-French plans to interdict the Soviet oil supply 7 The Soviet-Finnish Winter War 7.1 The Red Army's performance 7.2 The economy and the internal situation 8 Assessments running up to Barbarossa 8.1 The economy and internal stability 8.2 The production and quality of munitions 8.3 Milita
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