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There seems little doubt that we have made progress in scientific theories, but how? Theories of Scientific Progress presents the arguments, covers interpretations of scientific progress and discusses the latest contemporary debates.
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There seems little doubt that we have made progress in scientific theories, but how? Theories of Scientific Progress presents the arguments, covers interpretations of scientific progress and discusses the latest contemporary debates.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 192
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. Oktober 2003
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 232mm x 161mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 358g
- ISBN-13: 9780415320672
- ISBN-10: 0415320674
- Artikelnr.: 22332017
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 192
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. Oktober 2003
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 232mm x 161mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 358g
- ISBN-13: 9780415320672
- ISBN-10: 0415320674
- Artikelnr.: 22332017
John Losee is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Lafayette College, Eason, PA. He is the author of A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (1972), which has been translated into eleven foreign languages and is currently in its fourth English Edition, and Philosophy of Science and Historical Enquiry (1987).
Introduction Part I: Progress as Incorporation 1. Whewell's
'Tributary-River' Image of Scientific Progress 2. Brewster on How Not To Do
History of Science 3. Mill's Objections to Whewell's Historicism 4.
Progress Through Reduction 5. Lakatos' Version of the 'Progress Is
Incorporation' Thesis 6. Progress and the Asymptotic Agreement of
Calculations Part 2: Progress as Revolutionary Overthrow 7. I. B. Cohen on
the Identification of Scientific Revolutions 8. Kuhn's Taxonomic Criterion
9. Toulmin's 'Ideals of Natural Order' 10. Ideological Upheaval and
Revolutionary Change 11. Kuhn's Three-Beat Pattern 12. Laudan's
Reticulational Model of Scientific Change 13. Popper on Progress Through
Overthrow-With-Incorporation Part 3: Descriptive Theories of Scientific
Progress 14. Normative and Descriptive Theories 15. Scientific Progress and
Convergence Upon Truth a. Peirce on Science as a Self-Correcting Enterprise
b. Duhem and Quine on the Limits of Falsification c. Cartwright on the
Importance of False Theories d. Rescher on Methodological Pragmatism and
Scientific Progress e. Progress, Realism and Miracles 16. Laudan on
Scientific Progress as Increasing Problem-Solving Effectiveness 17. Kitcher
on Conceptual Progress and Explanatory Progress 18. Normative Naturalism
19. Scientific Progress and the Theory of Organic Evolution a. Toulmin on
Conceptual Evolution b. Hull on Selection Processes c. Is the Evolutionary
Analogy Appropriate? d. Campbell and Popper on Blind Variation and
Selective Retention e. Does the Evolutionary Analogy have Explanatory
Value? f. Ruse on the Evolutionary Origins of Evaluative Standards.
Conclusion
'Tributary-River' Image of Scientific Progress 2. Brewster on How Not To Do
History of Science 3. Mill's Objections to Whewell's Historicism 4.
Progress Through Reduction 5. Lakatos' Version of the 'Progress Is
Incorporation' Thesis 6. Progress and the Asymptotic Agreement of
Calculations Part 2: Progress as Revolutionary Overthrow 7. I. B. Cohen on
the Identification of Scientific Revolutions 8. Kuhn's Taxonomic Criterion
9. Toulmin's 'Ideals of Natural Order' 10. Ideological Upheaval and
Revolutionary Change 11. Kuhn's Three-Beat Pattern 12. Laudan's
Reticulational Model of Scientific Change 13. Popper on Progress Through
Overthrow-With-Incorporation Part 3: Descriptive Theories of Scientific
Progress 14. Normative and Descriptive Theories 15. Scientific Progress and
Convergence Upon Truth a. Peirce on Science as a Self-Correcting Enterprise
b. Duhem and Quine on the Limits of Falsification c. Cartwright on the
Importance of False Theories d. Rescher on Methodological Pragmatism and
Scientific Progress e. Progress, Realism and Miracles 16. Laudan on
Scientific Progress as Increasing Problem-Solving Effectiveness 17. Kitcher
on Conceptual Progress and Explanatory Progress 18. Normative Naturalism
19. Scientific Progress and the Theory of Organic Evolution a. Toulmin on
Conceptual Evolution b. Hull on Selection Processes c. Is the Evolutionary
Analogy Appropriate? d. Campbell and Popper on Blind Variation and
Selective Retention e. Does the Evolutionary Analogy have Explanatory
Value? f. Ruse on the Evolutionary Origins of Evaluative Standards.
Conclusion
Introduction Part I: Progress as Incorporation 1. Whewell's
'Tributary-River' Image of Scientific Progress 2. Brewster on How Not To Do
History of Science 3. Mill's Objections to Whewell's Historicism 4.
Progress Through Reduction 5. Lakatos' Version of the 'Progress Is
Incorporation' Thesis 6. Progress and the Asymptotic Agreement of
Calculations Part 2: Progress as Revolutionary Overthrow 7. I. B. Cohen on
the Identification of Scientific Revolutions 8. Kuhn's Taxonomic Criterion
9. Toulmin's 'Ideals of Natural Order' 10. Ideological Upheaval and
Revolutionary Change 11. Kuhn's Three-Beat Pattern 12. Laudan's
Reticulational Model of Scientific Change 13. Popper on Progress Through
Overthrow-With-Incorporation Part 3: Descriptive Theories of Scientific
Progress 14. Normative and Descriptive Theories 15. Scientific Progress and
Convergence Upon Truth a. Peirce on Science as a Self-Correcting Enterprise
b. Duhem and Quine on the Limits of Falsification c. Cartwright on the
Importance of False Theories d. Rescher on Methodological Pragmatism and
Scientific Progress e. Progress, Realism and Miracles 16. Laudan on
Scientific Progress as Increasing Problem-Solving Effectiveness 17. Kitcher
on Conceptual Progress and Explanatory Progress 18. Normative Naturalism
19. Scientific Progress and the Theory of Organic Evolution a. Toulmin on
Conceptual Evolution b. Hull on Selection Processes c. Is the Evolutionary
Analogy Appropriate? d. Campbell and Popper on Blind Variation and
Selective Retention e. Does the Evolutionary Analogy have Explanatory
Value? f. Ruse on the Evolutionary Origins of Evaluative Standards.
Conclusion
'Tributary-River' Image of Scientific Progress 2. Brewster on How Not To Do
History of Science 3. Mill's Objections to Whewell's Historicism 4.
Progress Through Reduction 5. Lakatos' Version of the 'Progress Is
Incorporation' Thesis 6. Progress and the Asymptotic Agreement of
Calculations Part 2: Progress as Revolutionary Overthrow 7. I. B. Cohen on
the Identification of Scientific Revolutions 8. Kuhn's Taxonomic Criterion
9. Toulmin's 'Ideals of Natural Order' 10. Ideological Upheaval and
Revolutionary Change 11. Kuhn's Three-Beat Pattern 12. Laudan's
Reticulational Model of Scientific Change 13. Popper on Progress Through
Overthrow-With-Incorporation Part 3: Descriptive Theories of Scientific
Progress 14. Normative and Descriptive Theories 15. Scientific Progress and
Convergence Upon Truth a. Peirce on Science as a Self-Correcting Enterprise
b. Duhem and Quine on the Limits of Falsification c. Cartwright on the
Importance of False Theories d. Rescher on Methodological Pragmatism and
Scientific Progress e. Progress, Realism and Miracles 16. Laudan on
Scientific Progress as Increasing Problem-Solving Effectiveness 17. Kitcher
on Conceptual Progress and Explanatory Progress 18. Normative Naturalism
19. Scientific Progress and the Theory of Organic Evolution a. Toulmin on
Conceptual Evolution b. Hull on Selection Processes c. Is the Evolutionary
Analogy Appropriate? d. Campbell and Popper on Blind Variation and
Selective Retention e. Does the Evolutionary Analogy have Explanatory
Value? f. Ruse on the Evolutionary Origins of Evaluative Standards.
Conclusion