Duncan Black
Theory Committees and Elections
Duncan Black
Theory Committees and Elections
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Duncan Black aims to formulate a pure science of politics by focusing on mathematics of committees and elections.
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Duncan Black aims to formulate a pure science of politics by focusing on mathematics of committees and elections.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 258
- Erscheinungstermin: 8. September 2010
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 216mm x 140mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 369g
- ISBN-13: 9780521141208
- ISBN-10: 0521141206
- Artikelnr.: 32302403
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 258
- Erscheinungstermin: 8. September 2010
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 216mm x 140mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 369g
- ISBN-13: 9780521141208
- ISBN-10: 0521141206
- Artikelnr.: 32302403
Preface
Acknowledgements
Part I. The Theory of Committees and Elections: 1. A committee and motions
2. Independent valuation
3. Can a motion be represented by the same symbol on different schedules?
4. A committee using a simple majority: single-peaked preference curves
5. A committee using a simple majority: other shapes of preference curves
6. A committee using a simple majority: any shapes of preference curves, number of motions finite
7. Cyclical majorities
8. When the ordinary committee procedure is in use the members scales of valuation may be incomplete
9. Which candidate ought to be elected?
10. Examination of some methods of election in single-member constituencies
11. Proportional representation
12. The decisions of a committee using a special majority
13. The elasticity of committee decisions with an altering size of majority
14. The elasticity of committee decisions with alterations in the members' preference schedules
15. The converse problem: the group of schedules to correspond to a given voting matrix
16. A committee using a simple majority: complementary motions
17. International agreements, Sovereignty and the Cabinet
Part II. History of the Mathematical Theory of Committees and Elections (Excluding Proportional Representation): 18. Borda, Condorcet and Laplace
19. E. J. Nanson and Francis Galton
20. The circumstances in which Rev. C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) wrote his Three Pamphlets
Appendix
Notes
Index.
Acknowledgements
Part I. The Theory of Committees and Elections: 1. A committee and motions
2. Independent valuation
3. Can a motion be represented by the same symbol on different schedules?
4. A committee using a simple majority: single-peaked preference curves
5. A committee using a simple majority: other shapes of preference curves
6. A committee using a simple majority: any shapes of preference curves, number of motions finite
7. Cyclical majorities
8. When the ordinary committee procedure is in use the members scales of valuation may be incomplete
9. Which candidate ought to be elected?
10. Examination of some methods of election in single-member constituencies
11. Proportional representation
12. The decisions of a committee using a special majority
13. The elasticity of committee decisions with an altering size of majority
14. The elasticity of committee decisions with alterations in the members' preference schedules
15. The converse problem: the group of schedules to correspond to a given voting matrix
16. A committee using a simple majority: complementary motions
17. International agreements, Sovereignty and the Cabinet
Part II. History of the Mathematical Theory of Committees and Elections (Excluding Proportional Representation): 18. Borda, Condorcet and Laplace
19. E. J. Nanson and Francis Galton
20. The circumstances in which Rev. C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) wrote his Three Pamphlets
Appendix
Notes
Index.
Preface
Acknowledgements
Part I. The Theory of Committees and Elections: 1. A committee and motions
2. Independent valuation
3. Can a motion be represented by the same symbol on different schedules?
4. A committee using a simple majority: single-peaked preference curves
5. A committee using a simple majority: other shapes of preference curves
6. A committee using a simple majority: any shapes of preference curves, number of motions finite
7. Cyclical majorities
8. When the ordinary committee procedure is in use the members scales of valuation may be incomplete
9. Which candidate ought to be elected?
10. Examination of some methods of election in single-member constituencies
11. Proportional representation
12. The decisions of a committee using a special majority
13. The elasticity of committee decisions with an altering size of majority
14. The elasticity of committee decisions with alterations in the members' preference schedules
15. The converse problem: the group of schedules to correspond to a given voting matrix
16. A committee using a simple majority: complementary motions
17. International agreements, Sovereignty and the Cabinet
Part II. History of the Mathematical Theory of Committees and Elections (Excluding Proportional Representation): 18. Borda, Condorcet and Laplace
19. E. J. Nanson and Francis Galton
20. The circumstances in which Rev. C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) wrote his Three Pamphlets
Appendix
Notes
Index.
Acknowledgements
Part I. The Theory of Committees and Elections: 1. A committee and motions
2. Independent valuation
3. Can a motion be represented by the same symbol on different schedules?
4. A committee using a simple majority: single-peaked preference curves
5. A committee using a simple majority: other shapes of preference curves
6. A committee using a simple majority: any shapes of preference curves, number of motions finite
7. Cyclical majorities
8. When the ordinary committee procedure is in use the members scales of valuation may be incomplete
9. Which candidate ought to be elected?
10. Examination of some methods of election in single-member constituencies
11. Proportional representation
12. The decisions of a committee using a special majority
13. The elasticity of committee decisions with an altering size of majority
14. The elasticity of committee decisions with alterations in the members' preference schedules
15. The converse problem: the group of schedules to correspond to a given voting matrix
16. A committee using a simple majority: complementary motions
17. International agreements, Sovereignty and the Cabinet
Part II. History of the Mathematical Theory of Committees and Elections (Excluding Proportional Representation): 18. Borda, Condorcet and Laplace
19. E. J. Nanson and Francis Galton
20. The circumstances in which Rev. C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) wrote his Three Pamphlets
Appendix
Notes
Index.