Sanford C Goldberg

To the Best of Our Knowledge

Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Sandford C. Goldberg puts forward a theory of epistemic normativity that is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. This theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
• Seitenzahl: 294
• Erscheinungstermin: 15. Mai 2018
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 218mm x 140mm x 25mm
• Gewicht: 454g
• ISBN-13: 9780198793670
• ISBN-10: 0198793677
• Artikelnr.: 49786068

Autorenporträt

Sanford C. Goldberg is Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University. He works primarily in the areas of epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind and is the author of dozens of articles in these areas, as well as four monographs, including Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2010), and Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech (Oxford University Press, 2015). He is also the editor of the Oxford Handbook of Assertion (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Inhaltsangabe

* INTRODUCTION: The aim of this project
* I Foundations of Epistemic Normativity
* 1: Epistemically Proper Belief: the very idea
* 2: Epistemic Assessment: Core Criteria and General Expectations
* II Social Expectations, Epistemic Responsibility, and Epistemically
Proper Belief
* 3: Core Criteria I: Permissions to rely on cognitive processes
* 4: Core Criteria II: Coherence-Infused Reliabilism (CIR)
* 5: General Expectations I: Entitlements to expect and Social
Epistemic Responsibility
* 6: General Expectations II: Normative defeat and ultima facie
epistemic propriety
* 7: Epistemic Responsibility in (Social) Context