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Current Army force redesign efforts seek to fundamentally change the way tactical commanders conduct reconnaissance on the future battlefield. Cavalry organizations will replace their traditional combat capability with a surveillance capability. This raises a fundamental question about the nature of effective reconnaissance operations. Is close combat with the enemy an essential part of effective reconnaissance? Do combat formations still have to fight for information or do modern surveillance technologies change this paradigm? This research project seeks to answer this question through a qualitative analysis of soldier interviews following Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The study conclusively determines that the rapid tempo of modern warfare rendered lightly armored scout units virtually ineffective. In addition, the fluid, unconventional nature of the enemy seriously hampered the effectiveness of aerial surveillance platforms. Most commanders had to fight for the information they needed by engaging in close ground combat with their most survivable weapons platforms. These conclusions strongly suggest that Army reconnaissance units must maintain a robust combat capability if they will continue to support high-tempo offensive operations against an adaptive enemy.