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Transitions in Full Spectrum Operations: The Effects of Ethos
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During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Army demonstrated its unrivaled ability to overmatch an enemy in a conventional mechanized conflict. In less than six weeks, the Army, as part of the American led coalition, destroyed the Iraqi conventional forces, occupied its capital, and overthrew its regime. By all accounts, the Army's participation in the decisive operation phase of the campaign was a stunning success. Just as it had in Desert Storm, the Army validated its warfighting ethos built on sound doctrine and years of hard training. How did success in the initial phases of OIF fail to t...
During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Army demonstrated its unrivaled ability to overmatch an enemy in a conventional mechanized conflict. In less than six weeks, the Army, as part of the American led coalition, destroyed the Iraqi conventional forces, occupied its capital, and overthrew its regime. By all accounts, the Army's participation in the decisive operation phase of the campaign was a stunning success. Just as it had in Desert Storm, the Army validated its warfighting ethos built on sound doctrine and years of hard training. How did success in the initial phases of OIF fail to translate into success for the campaign? This monograph contends that the missteps following the initial success can be attributed to the same ethos that provided the tactical victory. This ethos, or tactical culture, holds the view that the Army's sole responsibility is to "fight and win our Nation's wars," and that winning the peace is someone else's responsibility. In spite of the Army's operational concept of full spectrum operations, the tactical culture blinded the Army leaders to the requirements to transition from offense to stability operations and caused a loss of initiative yet to be regained. To understand how the Army developed this tactical culture, the monograph chronicles the history of current Army doctrine and the concurrent development of the combat training center program. The author then shows how inconsistencies in the Army's capstone doctrine, and disconnects between it and its supporting doctrine contributed to the tactical culture. The author also shows how the combat training centers reinforced the ethos by focusing almost entirely on the tactical necessity to defeat the opposing force. Since the initial stage of OIF, the Army has continued to update its doctrine and training program to replicate the current operating environment found in Iraq and Afghanistan. These adjustments, such as doctrinal reviews and mission rehearsal exercises, have affected This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.