Transitions in Full Spectrum Operations: The Effects of Ethos
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During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Army demonstrated its unrivaled ability to overmatch an enemy in a conventional mechanized conflict. In less than six weeks, the Army, as part of the American led coalition, destroyed the Iraqi conventional forces, occupied its capital, and overthrew its regime. By all accounts, the Army's participation in the decisive operation phase of the campaign was a stunning success. Just as it had in Desert Storm, the Army validated its warfighting ethos built on sound doctrine and years of hard training. How did success in the initial phases of OIF fail to t...
During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Army demonstrated its unrivaled ability to overmatch an enemy in a conventional mechanized conflict. In less than six weeks, the Army, as part of the American led coalition, destroyed the Iraqi conventional forces, occupied its capital, and overthrew its regime. By all accounts, the Army's participation in the decisive operation phase of the campaign was a stunning success. Just as it had in Desert Storm, the Army validated its warfighting ethos built on sound doctrine and years of hard training. How did success in the initial phases of OIF fail to translate into success for the campaign? This monograph contends that the missteps following the initial success can be attributed to the same ethos that provided the tactical victory. This ethos, or tactical culture, holds the view that the Army's sole responsibility is to "fight and win our Nation's wars," and that winning the peace is someone else's responsibility. In spite of the Army's operational concept of full spectrum operations, the tactical culture blinded the Army leaders to the requirements to transition from offense to stability operations and caused a loss of initiative yet to be regained. To understand how the Army developed this tactical culture, the monograph chronicles the history of current Army doctrine and the concurrent development of the combat training center program. The author then shows how inconsistencies in the Army's capstone doctrine, and disconnects between it and its supporting doctrine contributed to the tactical culture. The author also shows how the combat training centers reinforced the ethos by focusing almost entirely on the tactical necessity to defeat the opposing force. Since the initial stage of OIF, the Army has continued to update its doctrine and training program to replicate the current operating environment found in Iraq and Afghanistan. These adjustments, such as doctrinal reviews and mission rehearsal exercises, have affected
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