The distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences - the idea that some sentences are true or false just in virtue of what they mean - is a famous focus of philosophical controversy. Gillian Russell reinvigorates the debate with a challenging new defence of the distinction, showing that it is compatible with semantic externalism.
The distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences - the idea that some sentences are true or false just in virtue of what they mean - is a famous focus of philosophical controversy. Gillian Russell reinvigorates the debate with a challenging new defence of the distinction, showing that it is compatible with semantic externalism.
Gillian Russell is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St Louis.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Acknowledgements Introduction I: The Positive View 1: The 'in virtue of' Relation 2: Meaning 3: Beyond Modality A: The Formal System II: A Defence 4: The Spectre of "Two Dogmas" 5: Definitions 6: More Arguments Against Analyticity III: Work for Epistemologists 7: Analytic Justification
Preface Acknowledgements Introduction I: The Positive View 1: The 'in virtue of' Relation 2: Meaning 3: Beyond Modality A: The Formal System II: A Defence 4: The Spectre of "Two Dogmas" 5: Definitions 6: More Arguments Against Analyticity III: Work for Epistemologists 7: Analytic Justification
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