Bettina Kuon

Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O

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Produktdetails

• Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 412
• Verlag: Springer / Springer Berlin Heidelberg / Springer, Berlin
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-3-540-57920-5
• 1994.
• Seitenzahl: 312
• Erscheinungstermin: 28. Juni 1994
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 155mm x 17mm
• Gewicht: 408g
• ISBN-13: 9783540579205
• ISBN-10: 3540579206
• Artikelnr.: 24937275

Inhaltsangabe

1. Introduction.- I: The Game Theoretic Analysis.- 2. Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information.- 3. The Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies.- II: The Game Playing Experiment.- 4. Related Bargaining Experiments.- 5. The Experimental Design.- 6. The Agreement Outcomes.- 7. Break Offs.- 8, Further Aspects.- 9. The Bargaining Process.- 10. Individual Adaptation to Experience.- 11. A Picture of the Subjects' Behavior.- III: The Strategy Experiment.- 12. The Strategy Experiment.- 13. Typicalness of the Final Strategies.- 14. An Evolutionary Tournament.- 15. Summary and Conclusions.- Appendix A. Instructions of the Game Playing Experiment.- Appendix B. Statistical Tests.- References.