James Ladyman

Understanding Philosophy of Science

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

In this exceptionally clear and engaging introduction to the philosophy of science, James Ladyman explores the philosophical questions that arise when we reflect on the nature of the scientific method and the knowledge it produces. He discusses whether fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge and reality might be answered by science, and considers in detail the debate between realists and antirealists about the extent of scientific knowledge. The style remains unassuming, bringing to life the essential questions in the philosophy of science. Ideal for any student of philosophy or science, the book requires no previous knowledge of either discipline. It contains suggestions for further reading and cross-references with an extensive bibliography, making this the ideal textbook for students coming to the subject for the first time. The second edition includes the following key features: new chapter 'Confirmation and Evidence' which will include Nicod's criterion and Hempel's symmetry thesis and Bayesianism new content added to the 'Revolutions and Rationality' chapter, including Post-Kuhnian views of the scientific method more content on social factors in science and recent views of science.

---

Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Seitenzahl: 304
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. Januar 2026
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm
• ISBN-13: 9781138301047
• ISBN-10: 1138301043
• Artikelnr.: 60001127

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction
Section I: The Scientific Method
Chapter 1: Induction
1.1 The Sceptic's Challenge 1.2 The Scientific Revolution 1.3 The 'New
Tool' of Induction
1.4 Naïve Inductivism
Chapter 2: Problems of Observation and Induction
2.1 The Problem of Induction 2.2 Solutions and Dissolutions of the Problem
of Induction
2.3 Inductivism and the History of Science 2.4 Theory and Observation 2.5
Conclusion
Chapter 3: Falsificationism
3.1 Popper and the Critique of Marxism and Psychoanalysis 3.2 Popper's
'Solution' to the Problem of Induction 3.3 The Context of Discovery and the
Context of Justification 3.4 The Duhem Problem 3.5 Problems with
Falsificationism 3.6 Sophisticated Inductivism
Chapter 4: Revolutions and Rationality
4.1 The Received View of Science 4.2 Kuhn's Revolutionary History of
Science
4.3 Paradigms and Normal Science 4.4 The Copernican Revolution 4.5 Theory
and Observation
4.6 Incommensurabilty 4.7 Post-Kuhnian views of the scientific method 4.8
Relativism, reason and the science wars 4.9 Science, History and society
Section II: Realism and Antirealism about Science
Chapter 5: Scientific Realism
5.1 Appearance and Reality 5.2 The Metaphysics of the External World 5.2.1
Realism and Ideaism
5.2.2 Idealism 5.3 Semantics 5.3.1 Logical Positivism 5.3.2 Semantic
Instrumentalism and Reductive Empiricism 5.3.3 Truth 5.4 Standard
Scientific Realism 5.5 Antirealism
Chapter 6: Underdetermination
6.1 Underdetermination 6.1.1 Weak Underdetermination 6.1.2 Strong
Underdetermination
6.1.3 The Duhem-Quine Thesis 6.1.4 Responses to the Underdetermination
Argument
6.2 Constructive Empiricism 6.2.1 Objections to Constructive Empiricism
6.2.1.1 The Observable and Unobservable 6.2.1.2 Acceptance and Belief
6.2.1.3 Selective Scepticism?
Chapter 7: Explanation and Inference to the Best Explanation
7.1 Explanation 7.1.1 The Covering Law Model of Explanation
7.1.1.1 The Deductive-Nomological Model 7.1.1.2 The Inductive Statistical
Model 7.1.1.3 Problems with the Covering-Law account 7.1.2 Other Theories
of Explanation 7.2 Inference to the Best Explanation
7.2.1 The Local Defence of Scientific Realism 7.2.2 The Global Defence of
Realism 7.2.3 Van Fraassen's Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation
7.3 Common Sense, Realism and Constructive Empiricism
Chapter 8: Confirmation and Evidence
8.1 Nicod's criterion and Hempel's symmetry thesis 8.2 The paradoxes of
confirmation 8.3 Bayesianism
8.4 Evidence and Time
Chapter 9: Realism About What?
9.1 Theory Change 9.1.1 Approximate Truth 9.1.2 Sense and Reference 9.1.3
The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 9.1.3.1 Realist Responses 9.1.3.2 Novelty
9.1.4 Counterexamples to the No-Miracles Argument 9.1.4.1 Realist Responses
to the Counterexamples 9.2 Multiple Models 9.3 Idealisation 9.4 Structural
Realism
Bibliography
Glossary