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Effects-based operations (EBO) increase the effectiveness of military operations against an asymmetric adversary to some extent. The increased effectiveness is achieved through an increased understanding of the enemy and the effects of military actions. However, EBO promises more than it can deliver. The criticism of EBO is focused on three areas: (1) the possibility to predict indirect effects, particularly concerning the will of a population and the decisions leaders make; (2) there is no explanation of how the different national powers are supposed to work together in order to achieve a…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
Effects-based operations (EBO) increase the effectiveness of military operations against an asymmetric adversary to some extent. The increased effectiveness is achieved through an increased understanding of the enemy and the effects of military actions. However, EBO promises more than it can deliver. The criticism of EBO is focused on three areas: (1) the possibility to predict indirect effects, particularly concerning the will of a population and the decisions leaders make; (2) there is no explanation of how the different national powers are supposed to work together in order to achieve a common goal; and most importantly, (3) the lack of substantive methodology used to reach the ultimate goal of EBO: behavioral change of the adversary. Positive behavioral change cannot be achieved through military means, and EBO does not address this problem in a sufficient way. Two different conflicts are used as case studies: Operation Motorman in Northern Ireland, 1972, and The Cambodian Incursion, 1970. These conflicts were chosen because they show how the use of military means can radicalize a population and because they also show how tactical and political actions can affect each other, and thus, the outcome a conflict.