Combining game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party Presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile congress.
Combining game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party Presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile congress.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
1. Divided government and interbranch bargaining 2. A natural history of veto bargaining, 1945-1992 3. Rational choice and the presidency 4. Models of veto bargaining 5. Explaining the patterns 6. Testing the models 7. Veto threats 8. Interpreting history 9. Conclusions.
1. Divided government and interbranch bargaining 2. A natural history of veto bargaining, 1945-1992 3. Rational choice and the presidency 4. Models of veto bargaining 5. Explaining the patterns 6. Testing the models 7. Veto threats 8. Interpreting history 9. Conclusions.
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