Vickrey Auction

Herausgegeben:Surhone, Lambert M.; Timpledon, Miriam T.; Marseken, Susan F.

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

High Quality Content by WIKIPEDIA articles! A Vickrey auction is a type of sealed-bid auction, where bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins, but the price paid is the second-highest bid. The auction was created by William Vickrey. This type of auction is strategically similar to an English auction, and gives bidders an incentive to bid their true value. Vickrey's original paper considered only auctions where a single, indivisible good is being sold. In this case, the terms Vickrey auction and second-price sealed-bid auction are equivalent, and are used interchangeably. When multiple identical units (or a divisible good) are being sold in a single auction, the most obvious generalization is to have all winning bidders pay the amount of the highest non-winning bid. This is known as a uniform price auction. The uniform-price auction does not, however, result in bidders bidding their true valuations as they do in a second-price auction unless each bidder has demand for only a single unit.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Betascript Publishing
• Seitenzahl: 80
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9786131111068
• ISBN-10: 6131111065
• Artikelnr.: 29944692