Virtue and Meaning argues that any adequate neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic must account for our distinctive nature as the meaning-seeking animal. This book is intended for philosophers and other readers who have an interest in virtue ethics and the perennial question of the meaning of life.
Virtue and Meaning argues that any adequate neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic must account for our distinctive nature as the meaning-seeking animal. This book is intended for philosophers and other readers who have an interest in virtue ethics and the perennial question of the meaning of life.
David McPherson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Creighton University, Omaha. He is the editor of Spirituality and the Good Life: Philosophical Approaches (Cambridge, 2017).
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction: toward re-enchantment 1. The human form of life 1.1 Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism: the disenchanted version 1.2 The human difference: rationality 1.3 The standpoint from within our human form of life: the space of meaning 1.4 Strong evaluative meaning 1.5 Going further: the way forward 2. Virtue, happiness, and meaning 2.1 The instrumentalist account 2.2 The constitutive account: strong evaluative version 2.3 The constitutive account: weak evaluative version 2.4 Virtue apart from happiness? 2.5 Virtue, loss, and the meaning of life 3. Other-regarding concern 3.1 MacIntyre on other-regarding concern 3.2 Intrinsic worth: dignity and sanctity 3.3 Fully amongst us: solidarity with the severely afflicted and other marginalized humans 3.4 Moral absolutes 3.5 Spheres of other-regarding concern: universal and particular 4. Cosmic outlooks 4.1 Hursthouse's three theses and Williams' challenge 4.2 Identifying what is noblest and best 4.3 Against quietism: the need for a moral ontology 4.4 Rival cosmic outlooks 4.5 A poker-faced universe? 5. Homo Religiosus 5.1 What is spirituality? 5.2 What kind of naturalism? 5.3 Human beings as Homo Religiosus 5.4 The contemplative life 5.5 Theistic spirituality 5.6 Objections and replies Conclusion.
Introduction: toward re-enchantment 1. The human form of life 1.1 Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism: the disenchanted version 1.2 The human difference: rationality 1.3 The standpoint from within our human form of life: the space of meaning 1.4 Strong evaluative meaning 1.5 Going further: the way forward 2. Virtue, happiness, and meaning 2.1 The instrumentalist account 2.2 The constitutive account: strong evaluative version 2.3 The constitutive account: weak evaluative version 2.4 Virtue apart from happiness? 2.5 Virtue, loss, and the meaning of life 3. Other-regarding concern 3.1 MacIntyre on other-regarding concern 3.2 Intrinsic worth: dignity and sanctity 3.3 Fully amongst us: solidarity with the severely afflicted and other marginalized humans 3.4 Moral absolutes 3.5 Spheres of other-regarding concern: universal and particular 4. Cosmic outlooks 4.1 Hursthouse's three theses and Williams' challenge 4.2 Identifying what is noblest and best 4.3 Against quietism: the need for a moral ontology 4.4 Rival cosmic outlooks 4.5 A poker-faced universe? 5. Homo Religiosus 5.1 What is spirituality? 5.2 What kind of naturalism? 5.3 Human beings as Homo Religiosus 5.4 The contemplative life 5.5 Theistic spirituality 5.6 Objections and replies Conclusion.
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