This book develops an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice, examining three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal.
This book develops an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice, examining three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal.
Orit Kedar is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at MIT. Her dissertation, on which this book is based, was the winner of the Noxon Toppan Award for Best Dissertation in Political Science at Harvard University. Her work has appeared in venues such as the American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Electoral Studies, and Political Analysis. She also serves on the editorial boards of Electoral Studies and Political Analysis.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I. Voting for Policy: 1. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice; 2. A theory of compensatory vote; Part II. Empirical Evidence: How Voters Compensate for Diffusion of Power: 3. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies; 4. Balancing strong (and weak) presidents; 5. Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany; Part III. Conclusion and Theoretical Implications: 6. Summary, extensions, and implications.
Part I. Voting for Policy: 1. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice; 2. A theory of compensatory vote; Part II. Empirical Evidence: How Voters Compensate for Diffusion of Power: 3. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies; 4. Balancing strong (and weak) presidents; 5. Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany; Part III. Conclusion and Theoretical Implications: 6. Summary, extensions, and implications.
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