Orit Kedar

Voting for Policy, Not Parties

How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book develops an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice, examining three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 240
• Erscheinungstermin: 15. August 2013
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 14mm
• Gewicht: 396g
• ISBN-13: 9781107617919
• ISBN-10: 110761791X
• Artikelnr.: 40189614

Autorenporträt

Orit Kedar is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at MIT. Her dissertation, on which this book is based, was the winner of the Noxon Toppan Award for Best Dissertation in Political Science at Harvard University. Her work has appeared in venues such as the American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Electoral Studies, and Political Analysis. She also serves on the editorial boards of Electoral Studies and Political Analysis.

Inhaltsangabe

Part I. Voting for Policy: 1. Introduction: institutional sources of voter
choice; 2. A theory of compensatory vote; Part II. Empirical Evidence: How
Voters Compensate for Diffusion of Power: 3. Compensatory vote in
parliamentary democracies; 4. Balancing strong (and weak) presidents; 5.
Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany; Part III.
Conclusion and Theoretical Implications: 6. Summary, extensions, and
implications.