Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein

We All Lost the Cold War

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Princeton University Press
• Seitenzahl: 558
• Erscheinungstermin: 23. Juli 1995
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 33mm
• Gewicht: 895g
• ISBN-13: 9780691019413
• ISBN-10: 069101941X
• Artikelnr.: 22097553

Autorenporträt

Richard Ned Lebow is Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Janice Gross Stein is Harrison Professor of Conflict Management and Negotiation at the University of Toronto.

Inhaltsangabe

Preface
Abbreviations
Ch. 1
Introduction
3
Pt. 1
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Ch. 2
Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives
19
Ch. 3
Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics
51
Ch. 4
Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate?
67
Ch. 5
Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis?
94
Ch. 6
The Crisis and Its Resolution
110
Pt. 2
The Crisis in the Middle East, October 1973
Ch. 7
The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973
149
Ch. 8
The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts
182
Ch. 9
The Failure to Stop the Fighting
198
Ch. 10
The Failure to Avoid Confrontation
226
Ch. 11
The Crisis and Its Resolution
261
Pt. 3
Deterrence, Compellence, and the Cold War
Ch. 12
How Crises Are Resolved
291
Ch. 13
Deterrence and Crisis Management
324
Ch. 14
Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons
348
Postscript. Deterrence and the End of the Cold War
369
Notes
377
Appendix
523
Name Index
527
General Index
535

Rezensionen

The orthodoxy . . . is that deterrence worked and the arms race defeated the Soviet Union. Hitherto there has been little dissent from those positions, apart from those 'revisionist' historians who merely turned the whole orthodoxy on its head. . . . Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein are not revisionists in that sense. They are far too sensible for emotional nonsense of that kind. Yet their work is quite as unorthodox, probably as shocking to the closed corporation of Cold War 'scholars' but much more surprising than that of the Chomskyans.