This groundbreaking study offers a major reinterpretation of American strategy during the first half of the Vietnam War. Gregory A. Daddis argues senior military leaders developed a comprehensive campaign strategy, one not confined to 'attrition' of enemy forces. This innovative work is a must for a genuine understanding of the Vietnam War.
This groundbreaking study offers a major reinterpretation of American strategy during the first half of the Vietnam War. Gregory A. Daddis argues senior military leaders developed a comprehensive campaign strategy, one not confined to 'attrition' of enemy forces. This innovative work is a must for a genuine understanding of the Vietnam War.
Gregory Daddis is Colonel and Professor of History, United States Military Academy.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Introduction: A Word on War and Strategy 1. Conceiving Strategy for the Cold War Era 2. From Advice to Support to War 3. The Myth of Attrition in Vietnam 4. On Bewildering Battlefields: Implementing Westmoreland's Strategy 5. The Parallel War 6. Training an Uncertain Army Conclusion: When Strategy May Not Matter
Preface Introduction: A Word on War and Strategy 1. Conceiving Strategy for the Cold War Era 2. From Advice to Support to War 3. The Myth of Attrition in Vietnam 4. On Bewildering Battlefields: Implementing Westmoreland's Strategy 5. The Parallel War 6. Training an Uncertain Army Conclusion: When Strategy May Not Matter
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