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The ability to recognize a failing strategy is at least as important as the ability to compose a successful one. But despite its importance, this skill is underappreciated and difficult to develop. The existing literature on military failure obscures the true nature of defeat by focusing primarily on moral and physical deficiencies, or on personal and professional incompetence. The truth is that failure oftengradually emerges from the consequences of countless small actions and decisions; in Winston Churchill's phrase, "The terrible Ifs accumulate." Thus, identifying the "terrible Ifs" may…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
The ability to recognize a failing strategy is at least as important as the ability to compose a successful one. But despite its importance, this skill is underappreciated and difficult to develop. The existing literature on military failure obscures the true nature of defeat by focusing primarily on moral and physical deficiencies, or on personal and professional incompetence. The truth is that failure oftengradually emerges from the consequences of countless small actions and decisions; in Winston Churchill's phrase, "The terrible Ifs accumulate." Thus, identifying the "terrible Ifs" may provide commanders with warning signs that portend potential failure. Disaster theory describes a concept similar to the "terrible Ifs," an incubation period, during which events increasingly diverge from expectations. This paper examines three historical examples: theSicilian Expedition from the Athenian perspective, the Battle of Stalingrad from the German perspective, and the Battle of Dienbienphu from the French perspective. The present analysis identifies and describes the characteristics of the incubation period in each of the three examples just mentioned.
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