Karen Frost-Arnold (Associate Pr Associate Professor of Philosophy
Who Should We Be Online?
A Social Epistemology for the Internet
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Karen Frost-Arnold (Associate Pr Associate Professor of Philosophy
Who Should We Be Online?
A Social Epistemology for the Internet
- Gebundenes Buch
Who Should We Be Online? examines how power and social inequality shape knowledge and fuel misinformation on the internet. Drawing on numerous case studies, Frost-Arnold proposes structural and individual changes to make the internet more conducive to knowledge production and sharing.
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Who Should We Be Online? examines how power and social inequality shape knowledge and fuel misinformation on the internet. Drawing on numerous case studies, Frost-Arnold proposes structural and individual changes to make the internet more conducive to knowledge production and sharing.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press Inc
- Seitenzahl: 280
- Erscheinungstermin: 10. Januar 2023
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 164mm x 24mm
- Gewicht: 558g
- ISBN-13: 9780190089184
- ISBN-10: 0190089180
- Artikelnr.: 66125624
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Oxford University Press Inc
- Seitenzahl: 280
- Erscheinungstermin: 10. Januar 2023
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 164mm x 24mm
- Gewicht: 558g
- ISBN-13: 9780190089184
- ISBN-10: 0190089180
- Artikelnr.: 66125624
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Karen Frost-Arnold is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Hobart & William Smith Colleges. Her research focuses on the philosophy of the internet, the epistemology and ethics of trust, social epistemology, philosophy of science, and feminist philosophy.
* Acknowledgments
* Chapter 1: Introduction
* 1. Frameworks for social epistemology of the internet
* 1.1. The situated knowledge thesis
* 1.2. Feminist accounts of objectivity
* 1.3. Veritistic systems-oriented social epistemology
* 1.4. Epistemologies of ignorance
* 1.5. Virtue epistemology
* 1.6. Epistemic injustice
* 2. Chapter summaries
* Chapter 2: Moderators
* 1. What is online content moderation?
* 2. Varieties of moderation and censorship debates
* 3. The epistemic challenges of moderation
* 4. The virtues of moderators
* 5. Constraints on moderators
* 6. Commercial content moderation, epistemic exploitation, and
epistemic dumping
* 7. Algorithms to the rescue?
* Chapter 3: Imposters and Tricksters
* 1. Objectivity and truth
* 1.1. Objectivity and truth in feminist and veritistic epistemology
* 1.2. Objectivity, truth, and trust
* 2. Imposters: Undermining objectivity and truth
* 3. The need for trustworthiness
* 3.1. Trust and authenticity
* 3.2. Practical wisdom and trustworthiness
* 4. Tricksters: Resisting oppression
* 4.1. The epistemic benefits of betrayal
* 4.2. Internet tricksters
* 4.3. Changing epistemic landscapes and trickery
* 4.4. Who should we be online?
* Chapter 4: Fakers
* 1. What is fake news?
* 2. Causes of the fake news problem
* 2.1. Cognitive/psychological
* 2.2. Technological affordances/design features
* 2.3. Social causes
* 3. The epistemic damage of fake news
* 3.1. Fake news and false belief
* 3.2. Fake news and distrust
* 4. Fake news and white ignorance
* 5. Fake news, objectivity, and neutrality
* 6. Conclusion
* Chapter 5: Lurkers
* 1. The internet as a medium for unlearning ignorance
* 2. What is lurking?
* 3. The epistemic benefits of lurking
* 4. Epistemic limitations of lurking
* 5. Harmful modes of interaction: Ontological expansiveness
* 6. A virtue epistemology for lurking and online engagement
* 6.1. Virtues relevant to lurking and engagement
* 6.2. The importance of practical wisdom
* 7. Applying the virtue epistemology of lurking
* 8. Objections and replies
* Chapter 6: Conclusion
* Appendix: Internet Research Ethics for Philosophers: Privacy,
Positionality, and Power
* 1. Purpose of this appendix
* 2. Respecting privacy
* 2.1. Complications for the 'public data' presumption
* 2.2. Alternatives to simply quoting material one can access online
* 3. Protecting the researcher in an environment of online harassment
* 4. Avoiding epistemic appropriation
* 5. Cultivating a "traitorous identity" as a researcher
* References
* Index
* Chapter 1: Introduction
* 1. Frameworks for social epistemology of the internet
* 1.1. The situated knowledge thesis
* 1.2. Feminist accounts of objectivity
* 1.3. Veritistic systems-oriented social epistemology
* 1.4. Epistemologies of ignorance
* 1.5. Virtue epistemology
* 1.6. Epistemic injustice
* 2. Chapter summaries
* Chapter 2: Moderators
* 1. What is online content moderation?
* 2. Varieties of moderation and censorship debates
* 3. The epistemic challenges of moderation
* 4. The virtues of moderators
* 5. Constraints on moderators
* 6. Commercial content moderation, epistemic exploitation, and
epistemic dumping
* 7. Algorithms to the rescue?
* Chapter 3: Imposters and Tricksters
* 1. Objectivity and truth
* 1.1. Objectivity and truth in feminist and veritistic epistemology
* 1.2. Objectivity, truth, and trust
* 2. Imposters: Undermining objectivity and truth
* 3. The need for trustworthiness
* 3.1. Trust and authenticity
* 3.2. Practical wisdom and trustworthiness
* 4. Tricksters: Resisting oppression
* 4.1. The epistemic benefits of betrayal
* 4.2. Internet tricksters
* 4.3. Changing epistemic landscapes and trickery
* 4.4. Who should we be online?
* Chapter 4: Fakers
* 1. What is fake news?
* 2. Causes of the fake news problem
* 2.1. Cognitive/psychological
* 2.2. Technological affordances/design features
* 2.3. Social causes
* 3. The epistemic damage of fake news
* 3.1. Fake news and false belief
* 3.2. Fake news and distrust
* 4. Fake news and white ignorance
* 5. Fake news, objectivity, and neutrality
* 6. Conclusion
* Chapter 5: Lurkers
* 1. The internet as a medium for unlearning ignorance
* 2. What is lurking?
* 3. The epistemic benefits of lurking
* 4. Epistemic limitations of lurking
* 5. Harmful modes of interaction: Ontological expansiveness
* 6. A virtue epistemology for lurking and online engagement
* 6.1. Virtues relevant to lurking and engagement
* 6.2. The importance of practical wisdom
* 7. Applying the virtue epistemology of lurking
* 8. Objections and replies
* Chapter 6: Conclusion
* Appendix: Internet Research Ethics for Philosophers: Privacy,
Positionality, and Power
* 1. Purpose of this appendix
* 2. Respecting privacy
* 2.1. Complications for the 'public data' presumption
* 2.2. Alternatives to simply quoting material one can access online
* 3. Protecting the researcher in an environment of online harassment
* 4. Avoiding epistemic appropriation
* 5. Cultivating a "traitorous identity" as a researcher
* References
* Index
* Acknowledgments
* Chapter 1: Introduction
* 1. Frameworks for social epistemology of the internet
* 1.1. The situated knowledge thesis
* 1.2. Feminist accounts of objectivity
* 1.3. Veritistic systems-oriented social epistemology
* 1.4. Epistemologies of ignorance
* 1.5. Virtue epistemology
* 1.6. Epistemic injustice
* 2. Chapter summaries
* Chapter 2: Moderators
* 1. What is online content moderation?
* 2. Varieties of moderation and censorship debates
* 3. The epistemic challenges of moderation
* 4. The virtues of moderators
* 5. Constraints on moderators
* 6. Commercial content moderation, epistemic exploitation, and
epistemic dumping
* 7. Algorithms to the rescue?
* Chapter 3: Imposters and Tricksters
* 1. Objectivity and truth
* 1.1. Objectivity and truth in feminist and veritistic epistemology
* 1.2. Objectivity, truth, and trust
* 2. Imposters: Undermining objectivity and truth
* 3. The need for trustworthiness
* 3.1. Trust and authenticity
* 3.2. Practical wisdom and trustworthiness
* 4. Tricksters: Resisting oppression
* 4.1. The epistemic benefits of betrayal
* 4.2. Internet tricksters
* 4.3. Changing epistemic landscapes and trickery
* 4.4. Who should we be online?
* Chapter 4: Fakers
* 1. What is fake news?
* 2. Causes of the fake news problem
* 2.1. Cognitive/psychological
* 2.2. Technological affordances/design features
* 2.3. Social causes
* 3. The epistemic damage of fake news
* 3.1. Fake news and false belief
* 3.2. Fake news and distrust
* 4. Fake news and white ignorance
* 5. Fake news, objectivity, and neutrality
* 6. Conclusion
* Chapter 5: Lurkers
* 1. The internet as a medium for unlearning ignorance
* 2. What is lurking?
* 3. The epistemic benefits of lurking
* 4. Epistemic limitations of lurking
* 5. Harmful modes of interaction: Ontological expansiveness
* 6. A virtue epistemology for lurking and online engagement
* 6.1. Virtues relevant to lurking and engagement
* 6.2. The importance of practical wisdom
* 7. Applying the virtue epistemology of lurking
* 8. Objections and replies
* Chapter 6: Conclusion
* Appendix: Internet Research Ethics for Philosophers: Privacy,
Positionality, and Power
* 1. Purpose of this appendix
* 2. Respecting privacy
* 2.1. Complications for the 'public data' presumption
* 2.2. Alternatives to simply quoting material one can access online
* 3. Protecting the researcher in an environment of online harassment
* 4. Avoiding epistemic appropriation
* 5. Cultivating a "traitorous identity" as a researcher
* References
* Index
* Chapter 1: Introduction
* 1. Frameworks for social epistemology of the internet
* 1.1. The situated knowledge thesis
* 1.2. Feminist accounts of objectivity
* 1.3. Veritistic systems-oriented social epistemology
* 1.4. Epistemologies of ignorance
* 1.5. Virtue epistemology
* 1.6. Epistemic injustice
* 2. Chapter summaries
* Chapter 2: Moderators
* 1. What is online content moderation?
* 2. Varieties of moderation and censorship debates
* 3. The epistemic challenges of moderation
* 4. The virtues of moderators
* 5. Constraints on moderators
* 6. Commercial content moderation, epistemic exploitation, and
epistemic dumping
* 7. Algorithms to the rescue?
* Chapter 3: Imposters and Tricksters
* 1. Objectivity and truth
* 1.1. Objectivity and truth in feminist and veritistic epistemology
* 1.2. Objectivity, truth, and trust
* 2. Imposters: Undermining objectivity and truth
* 3. The need for trustworthiness
* 3.1. Trust and authenticity
* 3.2. Practical wisdom and trustworthiness
* 4. Tricksters: Resisting oppression
* 4.1. The epistemic benefits of betrayal
* 4.2. Internet tricksters
* 4.3. Changing epistemic landscapes and trickery
* 4.4. Who should we be online?
* Chapter 4: Fakers
* 1. What is fake news?
* 2. Causes of the fake news problem
* 2.1. Cognitive/psychological
* 2.2. Technological affordances/design features
* 2.3. Social causes
* 3. The epistemic damage of fake news
* 3.1. Fake news and false belief
* 3.2. Fake news and distrust
* 4. Fake news and white ignorance
* 5. Fake news, objectivity, and neutrality
* 6. Conclusion
* Chapter 5: Lurkers
* 1. The internet as a medium for unlearning ignorance
* 2. What is lurking?
* 3. The epistemic benefits of lurking
* 4. Epistemic limitations of lurking
* 5. Harmful modes of interaction: Ontological expansiveness
* 6. A virtue epistemology for lurking and online engagement
* 6.1. Virtues relevant to lurking and engagement
* 6.2. The importance of practical wisdom
* 7. Applying the virtue epistemology of lurking
* 8. Objections and replies
* Chapter 6: Conclusion
* Appendix: Internet Research Ethics for Philosophers: Privacy,
Positionality, and Power
* 1. Purpose of this appendix
* 2. Respecting privacy
* 2.1. Complications for the 'public data' presumption
* 2.2. Alternatives to simply quoting material one can access online
* 3. Protecting the researcher in an environment of online harassment
* 4. Avoiding epistemic appropriation
* 5. Cultivating a "traitorous identity" as a researcher
* References
* Index