Eighteen leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.
Eighteen leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.
Patrick Greenough is a senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews. His works in the Philosophy of Logic, the Philosophy of Language, and Epistemology. Duncan Pritchard gained his PhD from the University of St. Andrews. His research is mainly in epistemology and he has published widely in this area, including Epistemic Luck (OUP, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). Previously, he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling; he presently occupies the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh.
Inhaltsangabe
* Introduction * 1: Tony Brueckner: E = K and Perceptual Knowledge * 2: Quassim Cassam: Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed? * 3: Elizabeth Fricker: Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against * 4: Sanford Goldberg: The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Nature of Testimonial Knowledge * 5: Alvin Goldman: Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence * 6: John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio: Knowledge and Objective Chance * 7: Frank Jackson: Primeness, Internalism, Explanation * 8: Mark Kaplan: Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism * 9: Jonathan Kvanvig: Assertion, Knowledge and Lotteries * 10: Ram Neta: Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility * 11: Stephen Schiffer: Evidence = Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism * 12: Ernest Sosa: Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits * 13: Matthias Steup: Are Mental States Luminous? * 14: Neil Tennant: Cognitive Phenomenology, Semantic Qualia and Luminous Knowledge * 15: Charles Travis: Aristotle's Condition * 16: Timothy Williamson: Reponses to Critics
* Introduction * 1: Tony Brueckner: E = K and Perceptual Knowledge * 2: Quassim Cassam: Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed? * 3: Elizabeth Fricker: Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against * 4: Sanford Goldberg: The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Nature of Testimonial Knowledge * 5: Alvin Goldman: Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence * 6: John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio: Knowledge and Objective Chance * 7: Frank Jackson: Primeness, Internalism, Explanation * 8: Mark Kaplan: Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism * 9: Jonathan Kvanvig: Assertion, Knowledge and Lotteries * 10: Ram Neta: Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility * 11: Stephen Schiffer: Evidence = Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism * 12: Ernest Sosa: Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits * 13: Matthias Steup: Are Mental States Luminous? * 14: Neil Tennant: Cognitive Phenomenology, Semantic Qualia and Luminous Knowledge * 15: Charles Travis: Aristotle's Condition * 16: Timothy Williamson: Reponses to Critics
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