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Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been a reality for nation-states for millennia and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. The US military should strive to understand how to conduct them successfully. All military activities have associated risks and COIN is no different. Commanders who aptly manage these risks are more likely to achieve success. In COIN, force protection is one key risk commanders must balance to create the opportunity for success. This paper concludes that although protecting the force is necessary in any threat environment, an overemphasis on force protection actually limits the effectiveness of COIN operations. The US effort in Iraq, viewed as a case study, provides a key lesson for conducting successful COIN.