Leigh Tesfatsion

A New Swing-Contract Design for Wholesale Power Markets (eBook, PDF)

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

Provides comprehensive information on swing contracts for flexible reserve provision in wholesale power markets This book promotes a linked swing-contract market design for centrally-managed wholesale power markets to facilitate increased reliance on renewable energy resources and demand-side participation. The proposed swing contracts are firm or option two-part pricing contracts permitting resources to offer the future availability of dispatchable power paths (reserve) with broad types of flexibility in their power attributes. A New Swing-Contract Design for Wholesale Power Markets begins with a brief introduction to the subject, followed by two chapters that cover: general goals for wholesale power market design; history, operations, and conceptual concerns for current U.S. RTO/ISO-managed wholesale power markets; and the relationship of the present study to previous swing-contract research. The next eight chapters cover: a general swing-contract formulation for centrally-managed wholesale power markets; illustrative swing-contract reserve offers; inclusion of reserve offers with price swing; inclusion of price-sensitive reserve bids; and extension to a linked collection of swing-contract markets. Operations in current U.S. RTO/ISO-managed markets are reviewed in the following four chapters, and conceptual and practical advantages of the linked swing-contract market design are carefully considered. The book concludes with an examination of two key issues: How might current U.S. RTO/ISO-managed markets transition gradually to a swing-contract form? And how might independent distribution system operators, functioning as linkage entities at transmission and distribution system interfaces, make use of swing contracts to facilitate their participation in wholesale power markets as providers of ancillary services harnessed from distribution-side resources? In summary, this title: * Addresses problems with current wholesale electric power markets by developing a new swing-contract market design from concept to practical implementation * Provides introductory chapters that explain the general principles motivating the new market design, hence why a new approach is required * Develops a new type of swing contract suitable for wholesale power markets with increasing reliance on renewable energy and active demand-side participation A New Swing-Contract Design for Wholesale Power Markets is an ideal book for electric power system professionals and for students specializing in electric power systems.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: John Wiley & Sons
• Seitenzahl: 288
• Erscheinungstermin: 15. Dezember 2020
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781119670131
• Artikelnr.: 60779437

Autorenporträt

LEIGH TESFATSION received the Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of Minnesota, Mpls., in 1975, with a minor in mathematics. She is Research Professor of Economics, Professor Emerita of Economics, and Courtesy Research Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering, all at Iowa State University. Her principal current research areas are electric power market design and the development of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) platforms for the performance testing of these designs. She is the recipient of the 2020 David A. Kendrick Distinguished Service Award from the Society for Computational Economics (SCE) and an IEEE Senior Member. She has served as guest editor and associate editor for a number of journals, including the IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, the IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, the Journal of Energy Markets, the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, the Journal of Public Economic Theory, and Computational Economics.

Inhaltsangabe

Preface xiii

Author Biography xiv

Acknowledgments xv

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

Chapter 2 US RTO/ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets: Overview 9

2.1 Chapter Preview 9

2.2 General Goals for Wholesale Power Market Design 9

2.3 US RTO/ISO-Managed Market Operations 10

2.4 Stresses Faced by Current US RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 14

Chapter 3 Motivation For Current Study 17

3.1 Chapter Preview 17

3.2 Problematic Design Aspects of US RTO/ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets 17

3.2.1 Artificial Distinction Between Energy and Reserve 17

3.2.2 Problematic use of Hedonic Pricing 18

3.2.3 Revenue Insufficiency and Incentive Problems 19

3.2.4 Computational Fragility of LMP Derivations 20

3.2.5 Performance Payment in Advance of Performance Delivery 22

3.2.6 Minimal Direct Representation of Retail Customer Interests 23

3.2.7 Reliance on Overly Simplistic Cost Conceptions 24

3.2.8 Use of Spot-Market Pricing for Forward Markets 26

3.3 Relation of Current Study to Previous Swing-Contract Work 26

Chapter 4 Swing Contracts For Iso-Managed Wholesale Power Markets 29

4.1 Swing Contract Overview 29

4.2 Swing Contracts: General Formulation 29

4.3 Swing Contracts in Firm or Option Form 31

Chapter 5 Illustrative Swing-Contract Reserve Offers 35

5.1 Chapter Preview 35

5.2 A Simple Energy-Block Swing Contract in Firm Form 37

5.3 An Energy-Block Swing Contract in Option Form 40

5.4 Swing-Contract Implementation of Standard Supply Offers 41

5.5 A Swing Contract Offering Continuous Swing (Flexibility) in Power and Ramp 47

5.6 A Swing Contract Offering Battery Services 49

5.7 Swing-Contract Facilitation of Private Bilateral Contracting 52

Chapter 6 Swing-Contract Market Design 55

6.1 Chapter Preview 55

6.2 General Swing-Contract Market Formulation 55

6.3 Financial and Physical Feasibility of Swing-Contract Offers 58

6.4 Reserve Bids 58

6.5 Handling of Fixed Reserve Bids and Non-Dispatched Power 60

6.6 Performance Penalties and Incentives 60

6.7 ISO Cost Allocation 61

Chapter 7 Swing-Contract Market Optimization: Base-Case Milp Formulation 67

7.1 Chapter Preview 67

7.2 General Assumptions and Notation 68

7.3 Discretization of the ISO's Optimization Problem 69

7.4 ISO Objective Function 73

7.5 Complete Analytical MILP Formulation 74

7.6 Additional Discussion of Optimization Aspects 76

7.7 Five-Bus Test Case 78

7.8 Thirty Bus Test Case with Adaptive Reserve Zones 81

Chapter 8 Inclusion Of Reserve Offers With Price Swing 85

8.1 Chapter Preview 85

8.2 Cost Function Preliminaries 86

8.3 MILP Tractable form of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 87

Chapter 9 Inclusion Of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 93

9.1 Chapter Preview 93

9.2 Incorporation of Benefits 94

9.3 Modeling of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 96

9.3.1 Standard Demand Function Formulation 96

9.3.2 Reserve Bids with Time-of-Use Pricing 97

9.3.3 Reserve Bids with Price Swing 97

9.3.4 Reserve Bids Directly Expressed as Benefit Functions 99

9.4 MILP Tractable Approximation of Benefit Functions 100

Chapter 10 The Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 105

10.1 Chapter Preview 105

10.2 Multistage Optimization and Time Inconsistency 107

10.3 Settlement Time-Consistency of Swing-Contract