Yuen Foong Khong

Analogies at War (eBook, ePUB)

Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965

• Format: ePub

Produktbeschreibung

From World War I to Operation Desert Storm, American policymakers have repeatedly invoked the "lessons of history" as they contemplated taking their nation to war. Do these historical analogies actually shape policy, or are they primarily tools of political justification? Yuen Foong Khong argues that leaders use analogies not merely to justify policies but also to perform specific cognitive and information-processing tasks essential to political decision-making. Khong identifies what these tasks are and shows how they can be used to explain the U.S. decision to intervene in Vietnam. Relying on interviews with senior officials and on recently declassified documents, the author demonstrates with a precision not attained by previous studies that the three most important analogies of the Vietnam era--Korea, Munich, and Dien Bien Phu--can account for America's Vietnam choices. A special contribution is the author's use of cognitive social psychology to support his argument about how humans analogize and to explain why policymakers often use analogies poorly.

---

Dieser Download kann aus rechtlichen Gründen nur mit Rechnungsadresse in A, D ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: LSU Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 5. Mai 2020
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780691212913
• Artikelnr.: 59076844

Autorenporträt

Yuen Foong Khong

Inhaltsangabe

List of Figures and Tables
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Pt. I
The Argument
Ch. 1
Analogical Reasoning in Foreign Affairs: Two Views
3
Ch. 2
The AE Framework
19
Ch. 3
America's Vietnam Options
47
Pt. II
The Cases
Ch. 4
Containment, Analogies, and the Pre-1965 Vietnam Decisions
71
Ch. 5
Korea
97
Ch. 6
Dien Bien Phu
148
Ch. 7
Munich and the 1930s
174
Pt. III
The Implications
Ch. 8
The Psychology of Analogical Reasoning
209
Ch. 9
Conclusion
251
Bibliography
265
Index
279

Rezensionen

Khong's interviews and newly declassified documents make a compelling case the American decision-makers in 1965 used historical analogies not only to justify decisions but to make them, most notably in the process of rejecting options.