Fuzzy social choice theory is useful for modeling the uncertainty and imprecision prevalent in social life yet it has been scarcely applied and studied in the social sciences. Filling this gap, this book provides a comprehensive study of fuzzy social choice theory. It focuses on Arrow's theorem, one of the most important discoveries in social theory. The authors show how Black's median voter theorem solves the Arrowian impossibility theorem by restricting preferences to single-peaked profiles. They also obtain Arrow-type results using an involutive fuzzy complement.
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