Giles Pearson

Aristotle on What Emotions Are (eBook, PDF)

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

Providing the first systematic interpretation of what Aristotle thinks emotions are and pointing to some philosophical merits of his account, this book addresses, among other things, his view on how emotions form; how they relate to beliefs and perceptions; how they relate to desires; and how different emotions are distinguished from each other.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 384
• Erscheinungstermin: 15. August 2024
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780198879381
• Artikelnr.: 72268757

Autorenporträt

Giles Pearson is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Bristol University. He has taught philosophy at Bristol University since 2007. Prior to that he was a lecturer at Birkbeck College, London (2006-7) and a research fellow at Christ's College, Cambridge (2003-6). His Ph.D., on Aristotle on desire, was from St. John's College, Cambridge. He has published two books; a monograph Aristotle on Desire (2012), and an edited book (co-edited with M. Pakaluk) Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle (OUP, 2011). He has also published a number of articles on Aristotle in leading international peer-review journals in ancient philosophy and contributed to several prominent edited collections.

Inhaltsangabe

* Introduction : What This Book Aims to Achieve (and What It Doesnât).
A Map
* 1: Some Key Terminology and Distinctions. The Prospects for an
Analysis of Emotions in Terms of Other Intentional States
* PART I. EMOTIONS AS PLEASURES AND DISTRESSES
* 2: Emotions as Representational Hedonic States
* 3: Pleasure and Distress as Contributing to the Individuation of
Emotion Types
* 4: Emotions as Hedonic States That Are Formed in Response to
Intentional States That Apprehend Their Objects
* 5: Emotions and the Account(s) of Pleasure in the Ethics
* PART II. EMOTIONS AND DESIRES
* 6: Anger (OrgÄ)
* 7: Some Other (Putative) Links between Emotions and Desires
* 8: Appetite (Epithumia)
* PART III. THE MATERIAL DIMENSION OF EMOTIONS AND SOME PROBLEMATIC
CASES
* 9: The Material or Bodily Dimension of Emotions
* 10: Some Problematic Cases and the Supplements in the EE
Specification of the Emotions
* PART IV. FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND A SIGNIFICANT
PHILOSOPHICAL ADVANTAGE
* 11: Contrast with a Contemporary Motivation Theory. Which
Representational Role(s) Do Emotions Play?
* 12: Explaining Recalcitrant Emotions with Aristotle
* Catalogue of Aristotleâs Emotions as Representational Pleasures or
Distresses