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Bad Things addresses various philosophical questions about the nature and moral relevance of harm. The most basic question is this: under what conditions does an event (or do some events) harm a given individual? Neil Feit focuses primarily on the metaphysics of harm, and he both defends and extends the counterfactual comparative account of harm. On this account, in its most basic form, an act or event harms an individual provided that she would have been better off if it had not occurred. The counterfactual comparative account is widely accepted but also widely criticized. Feit provides…mehr

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Produktbeschreibung
Bad Things addresses various philosophical questions about the nature and moral relevance of harm. The most basic question is this: under what conditions does an event (or do some events) harm a given individual? Neil Feit focuses primarily on the metaphysics of harm, and he both defends and extends the counterfactual comparative account of harm. On this account, in its most basic form, an act or event harms an individual provided that she would have been better off if it had not occurred. The counterfactual comparative account is widely accepted but also widely criticized. Feit provides detailed and thorough responses to the most challenging objections. He argues that an adequate theory of harm should entail the counterfactual comparative account but also make room for a certain kind plural harm, where two or more events together harm an individual although neither one by itself is harmful. These harmful events are bad things, collectively, even if no single event is itself a bad thing. Feit sets out and defends a detailed account of plural harm, addressing issues about the magnitude and the time of the harm suffered by the victim. The primary focus of the book is on the metaphysics of harm, but issues concerning its normative or moral relevance are addressed. In particular, Feit questions the received view that there are strong reasons, which can be overridden only in unusual circumstances, against harming per se.

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Autorenporträt
Neil Feit is a SUNY Distinguished Teaching Professor at the State University of New York at Fredonia, where he has been a member of the Department of Philosophy since 1999. In addition to Bad Things, he has published two books and over 20 articles in ethics, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and other areas of philosophy. He has research interests in issues concerning the nature of harm in general, the harm of death in particular, and related issues in value theory.