This volume:
- Describes attacks and exploits with mathematical justifications, including selfish mining.
- Identifies common assumptions such as the Market Fragility Hypothesis, establishing a framework for analyzing incentives to attack.
- Outlines the block reward schedule and economics of ASIC mining.
- Discusses how adoption by institutions would fundamentally change the security model.
- Analyzes incentives for double-spend and sabotage attacks via stock-flow models.
- Overviews coalitional game theory with applications to majority takeover attacks
- Presents Nash bargaining with application to unregulated environments
This book is intended for students or researchers wanting to engage in a serious conversation about the future viability of Bitcoin as a decentralized, censorship-resistant, peer-to-peer electronic cash system.
Dieser Download kann aus rechtlichen Gründen nur mit Rechnungsadresse in A, B, BG, CY, CZ, D, DK, EW, E, FIN, F, GR, HR, H, IRL, I, LT, L, LR, M, NL, PL, P, R, S, SLO, SK ausgeliefert werden.