Ana Lorena De La O

Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America (eBook, PDF)

The Quiet Transformation

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

This book provides a theory and evidence to explain the initial decision of governments to adopt a conditional cash transfer program (the most prominent type of anti-poverty program currently in operation in Latin America), and whether such programs are insulated from political manipulations or not. Ana Lorena De La O shows that whether presidents limit their own discretion or not has consequences for the survival of policies, their manipulation, and how effective they are in improving the lives of the poor. This book is the first of its kind to present evidence from all Latin American CCTs.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 26. März 2015
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781316383049
• Artikelnr.: 52968790

Autorenporträt

Ana Lorena De La O is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University, Connecticut, where she is affiliated with the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, and the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. Her research relates to the political economy of poverty alleviation, clientelism, and the provision of public goods. Her work has appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, Comparative Political Studies, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. She earned her Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2007.

Inhaltsangabe

1. Introduction
2. The universe of cash transfer programs
3. The politics of fighting poverty
4. Explaining policy adoption and design
5. Explaining policy outcomes
6. Conditional cash transfers and clientelism
7. The electoral bonus of conditional cash transfers
8. Conclusions.