Christopher F. Zurn

Deliberative Democracy and the Institutions of Judicial Review (eBook, PDF)

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 26. März 2007
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780511276200
• Artikelnr.: 38209581

Autorenporträt

Christopher F. Zurn is associate professor of philosophy at the University of Kentucky. The recipient of a Humboldt Fellowship in 2004, he has published articles on deliberative democracy, judicial review, critical theory, feminism, moral theory, and aesthetics. An article on democracy and judicial review was chosen as one of the ten best philosophy articles published in 2002 by the editors of Philosopher's Annual, vol. XXV.

Inhaltsangabe

Part I. Introduction: 1. An old chestnut is actually two; 2. Pathologies of
ad hoc triangulation; 3. Functions and institutions; Part II. Majoritarian
Democracy and Minoritarian Constitutionalism: 4. Judicial review as
substantially legitimate protection of minority rights; 5. Judicial review
as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy; 6. Moving beyond
aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism; Part
III. From Majoritarian to Deliberative Theories of Constitutional
Democracy: 7. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis; 8.
Constitutionalism: four central elements; 9. Constitutional democracy?;
Part IV. Deliberative Democracy and Substantive Constitutionalism: 10.
Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism; 11. Guardians
of the moral law in the forum of principle; 12. Are substantialist defenses
of judicial review self-defeating?; Part V. Disagreement and the
Constitution of Democracy: 13. Democratic precommitment to judicial review:
Freeman; 14. Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial
review: Waldron; 15. Upshot: we need a theory of democratic
constitutionalism; Part VI. The Seducements of Juristic Discourse as
Democratic Deliberation: 16. A division of labor between juristic
deliberation and populist aggregation?; 17. Actual juristic discourse in
the United States system of constitutional adjudication; 18. Legal
principles and moral-political reasoning; Part VII. Constitutionalism as
the Procedural Structuring of Deliberative Democracy: 19. A provisional
summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review; 20.
Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas; Part VIII.
The Institutions of Constitutional Review I: Design Problems and Judicial
Review: 21. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional
review; 22. Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review
system; Part IX. The Institutions of Constitutional Review II: Horizontal
Dispersal and Vertical Empowerment: 23. Self-review panels in the
legislature and regulatory agencies; 24. Mechanisms for inter-branch debate
and decisional dispersal; 25. Easing formal amendability requirements; 26.
Establishing civic constitutional fora.