Sie sind bereits eingeloggt. Klicken Sie auf 2. tolino select Abo, um fortzufahren.
Bitte loggen Sie sich zunächst in Ihr Kundenkonto ein oder registrieren Sie sich bei bücher.de, um das eBook-Abo tolino select nutzen zu können.
Democracy and Interest Groups assesses the contribution that interest groups make to the democratic involvement of citizens and the generation of social capital. The authors draw on new surveys of groups and members and more unusually with non-participants. It also makes use of in-depth interviews with campaign group leaders and organizers.
Democracy and Interest Groups assesses the contribution that interest groups make to the democratic involvement of citizens and the generation of social capital. The authors draw on new surveys of groups and members and more unusually with non-participants. It also makes use of in-depth interviews with campaign group leaders and organizers.
GRANT JORDAN is Professor of Politics at Aberdeen University, UK. His first book (with Jeremy Richardson) was Governing Under Pressure (1979). Other major titles are Shell, Greenpeace and Brent Spar (2001); The British Administrative System (1994); Government and Pressure Groups in Britain (1987); The Protest Business (1997) with William A. Maloney; and Engineers and Professional Self-Regulation (1992).
WILLIAM A. MALONEY is Professor of Politics, University of Newcastle, UK. His major research outputs include: The European Automobile Industry (1999) with Andrew McLaughlin; The Protest Business (1997) with Grant Jordan; and Managing Policy Change in Britain (1994) with Jeremy Richardson. He has recently completed an edited research volume (with Sigrid Roßteutscher) Social Capital and Associations in European Democracies (2006).
Inhaltsangabe
Looking for Democracy: The Democratic Contribution of Membership Based Interest Groups The Collective Action Paradox: What Incentives Induce Participation? Olson Defied? Making Interests: Creating Members? The Business of Building Group Membership Understanding Joining - and Not Joining The Social Capital and Democratic Potential of Campaigning Organizations Reinforcing Polyarchy: What Groups do for Democracy?
Looking for Democracy: The Democratic Contribution of Membership Based Interest Groups The Collective Action Paradox: What Incentives Induce Participation? Olson Defied? Making Interests: Creating Members? The Business of Building Group Membership Understanding Joining - and Not Joining The Social Capital and Democratic Potential of Campaigning Organizations Reinforcing Polyarchy: What Groups do for Democracy?
Looking for Democracy: The Democratic Contribution of Membership Based Interest Groups The Collective Action Paradox: What Incentives Induce Participation? Olson Defied? Making Interests: Creating Members? The Business of Building Group Membership Understanding Joining - and Not Joining The Social Capital and Democratic Potential of Campaigning Organizations Reinforcing Polyarchy: What Groups do for Democracy?
Looking for Democracy: The Democratic Contribution of Membership Based Interest Groups The Collective Action Paradox: What Incentives Induce Participation? Olson Defied? Making Interests: Creating Members? The Business of Building Group Membership Understanding Joining - and Not Joining The Social Capital and Democratic Potential of Campaigning Organizations Reinforcing Polyarchy: What Groups do for Democracy?
Rezensionen
'This is an innovative text which combines a solid theoretical analysis with the results of a substantial research project. The text should be read by any scholar with an interest in the broad field of participation and would make a welcome addition to any academic library.' - Political Studies Review
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/neu