Economic Nature of the Firm (eBook, PDF)

A Reader
Redaktion: Kroszner, Randall S.

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holmstrom, John Roberts, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales, and others. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's nature and place in the market economy; Part II addresses the question of which transactions are integrated under a firm's roof and what limits the growth of firms; Part III examines employer-employee relations and the motivation of labor; and Part IV studies the firm's organization from the standpoint of financing and the relationship between owners and managers. The volume also includes a consolidated bibliography of sources cited by these authors and an introductory essay by the editors that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm and issues raised in the anthology.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 21. September 2009
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781316022320
• Artikelnr.: 40807839

Inhaltsangabe

Preface: reintroducing the economic nature of the firm; Part I. Within and
among Firms: The Division of Labor: 1. From The Wealth of Nations Adam
Smith; 2. From Capital Karl Marx; 3. From Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
Frank Knight; 4. From The Modern Corporation and Private Property A. A.
Berle and G. C. Means; 5. The use of knowledge in society Friedrich Hayek;
6. Corporate governance Luigi Zingales; Part II. The Nature of the Firm: 7.
The nature of the firm Ronald Coase; 8. Vertical integration, appropriable
rents, and the competitive contracting process Benjamin Klein, Robert
Crawford and Armen Alchian; 9. The governance of contractual relations
Oliver Williamson; 10. The limits of firms: incentive and bureaucratic
features Oliver Williamson; 11. Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the
organization of economic activity Paul Milgrom and John Roberts; 12. The
boundaries of the firm revisited Bengt Holmstrom and John Roberts; Part
III. The Employment Relation, the Human Factor and Internal Organization:
13. Production, information costs, and economic organization Armen Alchian
and Harold Demsetz; 14. Contested exchange; new microfoundations for the
political economy of capitalism Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; 15.
Understanding the employment relation: the analysis of idiosyncratic
exchange Oliver Williamson, Michael Wachter and Jeffrey Harris; 16.
Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership,
and job design Bengt Holstrom and Paul Milgrom; 17. Work motivation Truman
Bewley; 18. From Worker Participation John Pencavel; Part IV. Finance and
the Control of the Firm: 19. Mergers and the market for corporate control
Henry Manne; 20. Agency problems and the theory of the firm Eugene Fama;
21. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership
structure Michael Jensen and William Meckling; 22. Organizational forms and
investment decisions Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen; 23. The rise in
managerial stock ownership Clifford G. Holderness, Randall S. Kroszner and
Dennis P. Sheehan; 24. Executive compensation as an agency problem Lucian
Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried; 25. An economist's perspective on the
theory of the firm Oliver Hart; 26. Ownership and the nature of the firm
Louis Putterman.