Economics of Contracts (eBook, PDF)

Theories and Applications
Redaktion: Brousseau, Eric

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this 2002 book provides an overview of developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 17. Oktober 2002
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780511030369
• Artikelnr.: 38203402

Autorenporträt

ERIC BROUSSEAU is Professor of Economics at the University of Paris X.

Inhaltsangabe

Part I. Introduction: 1 Economics of contracts and renewal of economic
analysis Eric Brousseau and Jean -Michel Glachant; Appendix: canonical
models of three different theories of contract M'hand Fares; Part II.
Contracts, Organizations and Institutions: 2. The new institutional
economics Ronald Coase; 3. Contract and economic organization Oliver
Williamson; 4. The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing
relationships Benjamin Klein; 5. Entrepreneurship, transaction costs and
the design of contracts Erik G. Furubotn; Part III. Law and Economics: 6.
The contract as economic exchange Jacques Ghestin; 7. Contract theory and
theories of contract regulation Alan Schwartz; 8. Economic reasoning and
the framing of contract law Victor Goldberg; 9. A transactions costs
approach to the analysis of property rights Gary Libecap; Part IV.
Theoretical Developments: Where Do We Stand?: 10. Transaction costs in
incentive theory David Martimort and Eric Malin; 11. Norms and the theory
of the firm Oliver Hart; 12. Liquidity constraint and the allocation of
control rights Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey; 13. Complexity and contract
W. Bentley McLeod; 14. Authority, as flexibility, is the core of labour
contracts Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser; 15. Positive agency
theory: positioning and contribution Gerard Charreaux; Part V. Testing
Contract Theories: 16. Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of
developments in the empirical literature on contracting Scott Masten and
Stéphanie Saussier; 17. Experiments on moral hazard and incentives:
reciprocity and surplus sharing Marc Willinger and Claudia Keser; Part VI.
Applied Issues: Contributions to Industrial Organization: 18. Residual
claimancy rights and ongoing rents as incentive mechanisms in franchise
contracts: complements or substitutes? Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel
Raynaud; 19. The quasi judicial role of large retailers Benito Arrunada;
20. Interconnection agreements: strategic behaviour and property rights
Godefroy Dang N'guyen and Thierry Penard; 21. Licensing in the chemical
industry Asish Aroroa and Andrea Fosfuri; Part VII. Policy Issues:
Anti-trust and Regulation of Public Utilities: 22. Inter-industry
agreements and European community competition law Michel Glais; 23.
Incentive contracts in utility regulation Matthew Bennett and Catherine
Waddams Price; 24. Contractual choice and performance: the case of water
supply in France Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier; 25. Institutional or
structural reform: sequencing strategies for reforming the electricity
industry Pablo Spiller and Guy Holburn; 26. Electricity sector
restructuring and competition Paul Joskow.