Jayson L. Lusk

Experimental Auctions (eBook, PDF)

Methods and Applications in Economic and Marketing Research

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand individual and consumer behavior. Unfortunately, many currently available techniques for eliciting individuals' values suffer from a serious problem in that they involve asking individuals hypothetical questions about intended behavior. Experimental auctions circumvent this problem because they involve individuals exchanging real money for real goods in an active market. This represents a promising means for eliciting non-market values. Lusk and Shogren provide a comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions. It will be a valuable resource to graduate students, practitioners and researchers concerned with the design and utilization of experimental auctions in applied economic and marketing research.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 8. November 2007
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780511500183
• Artikelnr.: 38197009

Autorenporträt

Jayson L. Lusk is Professor and Willard Sparks Endowed Chair in the Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University.

Inhaltsangabe

1. Introduction
2. Theory of incentive compatible auctions and evidence from induced value experiments
3. Value theory
4. Conducting an experimental auction: some preliminaries
5. Conducting experimental auctions
6. Data analysis with experimental auction bids
7. Valuation case studies
8. Case studies on auction design
9. Validity of experimental auctions
10. Conclusion
Index.

Rezensionen

'These well-qualified authors provide a thorough treatise on the design and application of auction procedures as instruments for measuring the value of new or non-marketed commodities, rights and services - perhaps the most important development in experimental auctions since the first tests over 25 years ago.' Vernon L. Smith, winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economics and Professor of Economics and Law, George Mason University