Sie sind bereits eingeloggt. Klicken Sie auf 2. tolino select Abo, um fortzufahren.
Bitte loggen Sie sich zunächst in Ihr Kundenkonto ein oder registrieren Sie sich bei bücher.de, um das eBook-Abo tolino select nutzen zu können.
This book, first published in 2005, develops a comparative model of intergovernmental bargaining to account for variation in the capacity of federations in the developing world to undertake economic policy reform, suggesting that many market reform policies are a function of a constant process of bargaining between national and regional leaders struggling for political survival. As the degree of national-regional disagreement mounts, collective action on reforms that require implementation at multiple levels of government becomes more difficult. The degree to which the two factors conflict…mehr
This book, first published in 2005, develops a comparative model of intergovernmental bargaining to account for variation in the capacity of federations in the developing world to undertake economic policy reform, suggesting that many market reform policies are a function of a constant process of bargaining between national and regional leaders struggling for political survival. As the degree of national-regional disagreement mounts, collective action on reforms that require implementation at multiple levels of government becomes more difficult. The degree to which the two factors conflict depends on four factors: the individual electoral interests, a shared intergovernmental fiscal system, the manner in which regional interests are represented in national policy making and the levers of partisan influence national leaders have over subnational politicians. In testing the argument with a combination of cross-sectional time-series and case study analysis, this book contributes to the broad literatures on development and the comparative political economy of federalism and decentralization.
Dieser Download kann aus rechtlichen Gründen nur mit Rechnungsadresse in A, B, BG, CY, CZ, D, DK, EW, E, FIN, F, GR, HR, H, IRL, I, LT, L, LR, M, NL, PL, P, R, S, SLO, SK ausgeliefert werden.
Die Herstellerinformationen sind derzeit nicht verfügbar.
Autorenporträt
Erik Wibbels is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Washington. His research interests include market transitions, particularly in Latin America, and the political economy of federalism. His recent work has appeared in American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, International Organization, World Politics, Comparative Political Studies, and Studies in Comparative International Development. He is currently working on two book projects - one on the comparative historical foundations of federal constitutions and the other on the relationship between the global economy and redistributive politics in the developing world.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Intergovernmental bargaining and economic policy in federations; 2. From market-preserving to market-distorting federalism: divergent incentives and economic reform in developing nations; 3. Federalism and the decentralized politics of macroeconomic policy and performance; 4. Testing the argument - macroeconomic reform beyond the federal-unitary distinction; 5. Partisan harmony, vertical accountability, and market transitions - the case of Argentina; 6. Regional competition, fiscal dependence and subnational incentives in the Argentine provinces; 7. The view from below - the politics of public sector reform in three Argentine provinces; 8. Conclusion - comparative federalism, market reform, and future research; References.
1. Intergovernmental bargaining and economic policy in federations; 2. From market-preserving to market-distorting federalism: divergent incentives and economic reform in developing nations; 3. Federalism and the decentralized politics of macroeconomic policy and performance; 4. Testing the argument - macroeconomic reform beyond the federal-unitary distinction; 5. Partisan harmony, vertical accountability, and market transitions - the case of Argentina; 6. Regional competition, fiscal dependence and subnational incentives in the Argentine provinces; 7. The view from below - the politics of public sector reform in three Argentine provinces; 8. Conclusion - comparative federalism, market reform, and future research; References.
1. Intergovernmental bargaining and economic policy in federations; 2. From market-preserving to market-distorting federalism: divergent incentives and economic reform in developing nations; 3. Federalism and the decentralized politics of macroeconomic policy and performance; 4. Testing the argument - macroeconomic reform beyond the federal-unitary distinction; 5. Partisan harmony, vertical accountability, and market transitions - the case of Argentina; 6. Regional competition, fiscal dependence and subnational incentives in the Argentine provinces; 7. The view from below - the politics of public sector reform in three Argentine provinces; 8. Conclusion - comparative federalism, market reform, and future research; References.
1. Intergovernmental bargaining and economic policy in federations; 2. From market-preserving to market-distorting federalism: divergent incentives and economic reform in developing nations; 3. Federalism and the decentralized politics of macroeconomic policy and performance; 4. Testing the argument - macroeconomic reform beyond the federal-unitary distinction; 5. Partisan harmony, vertical accountability, and market transitions - the case of Argentina; 6. Regional competition, fiscal dependence and subnational incentives in the Argentine provinces; 7. The view from below - the politics of public sector reform in three Argentine provinces; 8. Conclusion - comparative federalism, market reform, and future research; References.
Rezensionen
"...a groundbreaking theoretical framework in Chapters 1 and 2...The combination of methodologies and the shifting in levels of analysis (from macro to micro comparisons) is used very effectively to test different parts of the main argument. The research design, in this regard, is ingenious and exemplary...Federalism and the Market is bound to leave a lasting imprint." - Perspectives on Politics, Tulia G. Falleti, University of Pennsylvania
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826