Colin S. Gray

Fighting Talk (eBook, PDF)

Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

Gray presents an inventive treatise on the nature of strategy, war, and peace, organized around forty maxims. This collection of mini-essays will forearm politicians, soldiers, and the attentive general public against many-probably most-fallacies that abound in contemporary debates about war, peace, and security. While one can never guarantee strategic success, which depends on policy, military prowess, and the quality of the dialogue between the two, a strategic education led by the judgments in these maxims increases the chances that one's errors will be small rather than catastrophic. The maxims are grouped according to five clusters. War and Peace tackles the larger issues of strategic history that drive the demand for the services of strategic thought and practice. Strategy presses further, into the realm of strategic behavior, and serves as a bridge between the political focus of part one and the military concerns that follow. In Military Power and Warfare turns to the pragmatic business of military performance: operations, tactics, and logistics. Part four, Security and Insecurity examines why strategy is important, including a discussion of the nature, dynamic character, and functioning of world politics. Finally, History and the Future is meant to help strategists better understand the processes of historical change.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc
• Seitenzahl: 208
• Altersempfehlung: ab 7 Jahre
• Erscheinungstermin: 30. April 2007
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780313082245
• Artikelnr.: 68529132

Autorenporträt

COLIN S. GRAY is a strategic theorist and defense analyst who has worked in Britain, Canada, and the United States./e He has written pioneering and controversial studies of nuclear strategy, arms control, maritime strategy, and geopolitics.

Inhaltsangabe

Preface Introduction: Getting the Big Things Right Enough Part I: War and
Peace 1 The Contexts of War Are All Important 2 War Is About Peace, and
Peace Can Be About War 3 It Is More Difficult to Make Peace than It Is to
Make War 4 War Works!-But Always Has Unintended and Unanticipated
Consequences 5 Peace and Order Are Not Self-Enforcing, They Have to Be
Organized and Kept by Somebody 6 Not Only Polities, but Societies and Their
Cultures Make War and Peace 7 Reason Reigns Over War, but Passion and
Chance Threaten to Rule 8 There Is More to War than Warfare 9 Policy Is
King, but Often Is Ignorant of the Nature and Character of War 10 War Is
Always a Gamble Part II: Strategy 11 Knowledge of Strategy Is Vital: The
Flame of Strategic Understanding Has to Be Kept Lit 12 Strategy Is More
Difficult than Policy or Tactics 13 Bad Strategy Kills, but So Also Do Bad
Policy and Tactics 14 If Thucydides, Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz Did Not Say
It, It Probably Is Not Worth Saying 15 The Strategic "Concept du Jour" Will
Be Tomorrow's Stale Left-Over, Until It Is Rediscovered, Recycled, and
Revealed as a New Truth 16 The Enemy Too Has a Vote 17 Time Is the Least
Forgiving Dimension of Strategy 18 Friction Is Unavoidable, but Need Not Be
Fatal 19 All Strategy Is Geostrategy: Geography Is Fundamental 20 Strategy
Is Not Wholly Military 21 The Impossible Is Impossible; It Is a Condition,
Not a Problem for Which a Solution Has Yet to Be Found Part III: Military
Power and Warfare 22 People Matter Most 23 Military Power Is Trumps in
Politics 24 Military Excellence Can Only Be Verified by Performance in War
25 Military Excellence Cannot Guarantee Strategic Success 26 Victory in
Battle Does Not Ensure Strategic or Political Success, but Defeat All but
Guarantees Failure 27 There Is More to War than Firepower: The Enemy Is Not
Just a Target Set 28 Logistics Is the Arbiter of Strategic Opportunity
Part IV: Security and Insecurity 29 Bad Times Return 30 There Are Always
Thugs, Villains, Rogues, and Fools Out There, as Well Some in Here, Who
Mean Us Harm 31 Superthreats Do Appear 32 Prudence Is the Supreme Virtue in
Statecraft and Strategy 33 Strategic History Punishes Good Intentions 34
Defense Costs Are Certain, but Security Benefits Are Uncertain and Arguable
35 Arms Can Be Controlled, but Not by Arms Control Part V: History and the
Future 36 Nothing of Real Importance Changes: Modern History Is Not Modern
37 History Can Be Misused to "Prove" Anything, but It Is All That We Have
as a Guide to the Future 38 The Future Is Not Foreseeable: Nothing Dates So
Rapidly as Today's Tomorrow 39 Surprise Is Unavoidable, but Its Effect Is
Not 40 Tragedy Happens Afterword: Cannon Lore Notes Bibliography Index