Seminar paper from the year 2004 in the subject Politics - Topic: European Union, grade: 1,5, Hamburg University of Ecomomy and Policy (European Studies), course: Political and economic systems in comparative perspective, language: English, abstract: This paper seeks to give a broad overview of the major developments in the French economic order since the Second World War. First by enlarging upon historical changes in the French economic policy and further by describing the structure of the economic sectors of the French economy today, focusing on the French companies. The strengths and weaknesses of the French industrial production will be reflected by an analysis of its export and import sectors. As a theoretical base for the paper serves the Varieties of Capitalism approach by Hall and Soskice. In their theory of comparative capitalism they regard France as one possible model of capitalism, namely in between a coordinated and a liberal market economy (CME/LME). In this paper Hall and Soskice´s theory is supposed to have an explanatory function for the described institutional characteristics in the French economic order. Generally Hall and Soskice´s approach has to be seen in the tradition of comparative political economy, yet going beyond former theories as Shonfield´s modernization approach, neocorporatism or the social systems of production approach. By drawing on game theory Hall and Soskice even create a interdisciplinary approach addressing both econonomics and political scientists. Hall/Soskice try to provide a new theoretical framework to analyse and understand the nationa l similarities and differences in political and economic institutions, shifting the focus of attention to the role of firms in the economic performance and the institutions that condition or alter interaction between economic actors. In these interactions, various actors e.g. firms rationally try to defend their interests. For firms the five most important interaction spheres vital for the firms development, production and profitability are industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter- firm relations and the interaction with their own employees. Interactions like these often create uneven information levels and thus entail coordination problems. Hall and Soskice take the view that the different ways in which firms handle these coordination problems can be used to compare national political economies. Firms in LMEs rather tend to solve their coordination problems with the help of market mechanisms. Firms in CMEs refer to non-market relationships, e.g. institutions that promote the exchange of information among actors. [...]