Neil Caplan

Futile Diplomacy, Volume 4 (eBook, ePUB)

Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1954-1956

• Format: ePub

Produktbeschreibung

This book, first published in 1997, focuses on the Anglo-American cooperation which began during the relatively uneventful years 1953 and 1954, and which led to a covert operation, code-named 'Alpha', which aimed - unsuccessfully - at convincing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to consider a settlement through secret negotiations. As with the other three volumes that make up Futile Diplomacy, this volume comprises Dr Caplan's expert in-depth analysis with a wealth of primary source documents, making this a key reference source in the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Taylor & Francis
• Seitenzahl: 438
• Erscheinungstermin: 15. Mai 2015
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781317441885
• Artikelnr.: 42887615

Autorenporträt

Neil Caplan

Inhaltsangabe

Part 1. The Background of Anglo-American Cooperation, 1948-54 1.
Anglo-American Support for Bilateral and United Nations Peace Efforts 1.1.
Dynamics of Anglo-American Cooperation 1.2. Support for Bilateral
Negotiations 1.3. Support for United Nations Initiatives 2. The Two-Pronged
Approach 2.1. 'A Gradual Process of Education' of the Arabs to Accept
Israel 2.2. Pressure on Israel for Gestures and Concessions 3. Nibbling at
the Edges: The Failure of Conflict Management 3.1. The Tripartite
Declaration 3.2. Diplomatic Representations in Support of UNTSO 3.3.
Anglo-American Proposals for Reducing Frontier Tensions 3.4. Starting a
Chain of Confidence-Building Measures 3.5. From the 'Edges' Back to the
Core Issues 4. Attempts at Conflict Resolution 4.1. Calls for a 'Positive
Policy' - A Settlement by Compulsion? 4.2. American and British Plans for a
Comprehensive Settlement 4.3. Convergence of British and American Thinking
Part 2. The Best Laid Plans 5. Preparing Alpha 5.1. British Good Offices
Offered 5.2. Looking for an Arab Opening; Keeping the Israelis Reassured
5.3. From Cooperation to Collaboration: Formulation of Anglo-American Terms
of Settlement 6. First Approaches 6.1. Eden and Nasir: First Hints of Alpha
6.2. Setbacks: Baghdad Pact and Gaza Raid 6.3. Byroade, Fawzi and Nasir:
Early Probings 6.4. London and Paris Meetings: Fine-Tuning the Negev
Proposals 6.5. Factoring in Israel: Security Treaty versus Arab-Israeli
Settlement Part 3. Stumbling from Obstacle to Obstacle 7. From Secret
Sounding to Public Pronouncements: The Dulles Statement, August 1955 7.1.
The Dulles Statement, August 1955 7.2. The Waiting Game, April-August 1955
7.3. Dulles' Decision to Go Public 7.4. The Dulles Statement 7.5. Aftermath
8. Arms and Alpha: The Arab Connection 8.1. Western Arms and Aid for the
Arabs 8.2. Soviet Arms for Egypt: The End of the Tripartite Monopoly 8.3.
Sharett's Hat-in-Hand Diplomacy: Paris and Geneva 8.4. Fears of an Israeli
Pre-emptive Strike 8.5. New Moves to Court Nasir 9. Eden's Guildhall
Speech, November 1955 9.1. Guildhall Speech: Seeking a Compromise between
1947 and the Status Quo 9.2. Arab Reactions 9.3. The Israeli Reaction 9.4.
Mahmud Fawzi: Principles behind the Egyptian Position 10. Showdown with
Sharett 10.1. Build-Up to a Confrontation between the US and Israel 10.2.
Dulles' 'Bombshell Surprise', 21 November 1955 10.3. Not Another Munich:
Israel Sets Out its Position 10.4. A New Israeli 'Peace Offensive'? 10.5.
Finessing US-Israeli Differences 10.6. Between Optimism and Pessimism 11.
Arms and Alpha: The Israeli Connection 11.1. Hesitations Regarding Israel's
Arms Requests 11.2. Lake Kinneret Raid 11.3. Arms as Carrots for
Negotiations 11.4. Arms and the Anderson Mission 11.5. A Brief Assessment
12. Alpha's Last Chance: The Anderson Mission 12.1. Preparing for American
Mediation 12.2. Anderson's Mission: Mandate and Expectations 12.3. First
Meetings in Cairo 12.4. First Meetings in Israel 12.5. Return to Cairo
12.6. Return to Jerusalem 12.7. Interlude: Washington, Cairo, Jerusalem
Conclusions 13. Alpha and Gamma: Post-Scripts and Post-Mortems 13.1. 'Last
Shot' at a Meeting between Nasir and Ben-Gurion 13.2. Anderson's Final
Visit 13.3. From 'Alpha' to 'Omega' 13.4. The Principal Players: Nasir and
Israel 14. Carrots and Sticks: The Limits of Anglo-American Coercive
Diplomacy 14.1. Militant Protagonists and International Opinion 14.2. The
Context: British and American Interests 14.3. Carrots and Sticks: An
Inventory 14.4. Anglo-American Cooperation 14.5. American and British
Presumptions 14.6. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy 14.7. 'Arms and the
Dam' 15. Documents

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Part 1. The Background of Anglo-American Cooperation, 1948-54 1. Anglo-American Support for Bilateral and United Nations Peace Efforts 1.1. Dynamics of Anglo-American Cooperation 1.2. Support for Bilateral Negotiations 1.3. Support for United Nations Initiatives 2. The Two-Pronged Approach 2.1. 'A Gradual Process of Education' of the Arabs to Accept Israel 2.2. Pressure on Israel for Gestures and Concessions 3. Nibbling at the Edges: The Failure of Conflict Management 3.1. The Tripartite Declaration 3.2. Diplomatic Representations in Support of UNTSO 3.3. Anglo-American Proposals for Reducing Frontier Tensions 3.4. Starting a Chain of Confidence-Building Measures 3.5. From the 'Edges' Back to the Core Issues 4. Attempts at Conflict Resolution 4.1. Calls for a 'Positive Policy' - A Settlement by Compulsion? 4.2. American and British Plans for a Comprehensive Settlement 4.3. Convergence of British and American Thinking Part 2. The Best Laid Plans 5. Preparing Alpha 5.1. British Good Offices Offered 5.2. Looking for an Arab Opening; Keeping the Israelis Reassured 5.3. From Cooperation to Collaboration: Formulation of Anglo-American Terms of Settlement 6. First Approaches 6.1. Eden and Nasir: First Hints of Alpha 6.2. Setbacks: Baghdad Pact and Gaza Raid 6.3. Byroade, Fawzi and Nasir: Early Probings 6.4. London and Paris Meetings: Fine-Tuning the Negev Proposals 6.5. Factoring in Israel: Security Treaty versus Arab-Israeli Settlement Part 3. Stumbling from Obstacle to Obstacle 7. From Secret Sounding to Public Pronouncements: The Dulles Statement, August 1955 7.1. The Dulles Statement, August 1955 7.2. The Waiting Game, April-August 1955 7.3. Dulles' Decision to Go Public 7.4. The Dulles Statement 7.5. Aftermath 8. Arms and Alpha: The Arab Connection 8.1. Western Arms and Aid for the Arabs 8.2. Soviet Arms for Egypt: The End of the Tripartite Monopoly 8.3. Sharett's Hat-in-Hand Diplomacy: Paris and Geneva 8.4. Fears of an Israeli Pre-emptive Strike 8.5. New Moves to Court Nasir 9. Eden's Guildhall Speech, November 1955 9.1. Guildhall Speech: Seeking a Compromise between 1947 and the Status Quo 9.2. Arab Reactions 9.3. The Israeli Reaction 9.4. Mahmud Fawzi: Principles behind the Egyptian Position 10. Showdown with Sharett 10.1. Build-Up to a Confrontation between the US and Israel 10.2. Dulles' 'Bombshell Surprise', 21 November 1955 10.3. Not Another Munich: Israel Sets Out its Position 10.4. A New Israeli 'Peace Offensive'? 10.5. Finessing US-Israeli Differences 10.6. Between Optimism and Pessimism 11. Arms and Alpha: The Israeli Connection 11.1. Hesitations Regarding Israel's Arms Requests 11.2. Lake Kinneret Raid 11.3. Arms as Carrots for Negotiations 11.4. Arms and the Anderson Mission 11.5. A Brief Assessment 12. Alpha's Last Chance: The Anderson Mission 12.1. Preparing for American Mediation 12.2. Anderson's Mission: Mandate and Expectations 12.3. First Meetings in Cairo 12.4. First Meetings in Israel 12.5. Return to Cairo 12.6. Return to Jerusalem 12.7. Interlude: Washington, Cairo, Jerusalem Conclusions 13. Alpha and Gamma: Post-Scripts and Post-Mortems 13.1. 'Last Shot' at a Meeting between Nasir and Ben-Gurion 13.2. Anderson's Final Visit 13.3. From 'Alpha' to 'Omega' 13.4. The Principal Players: Nasir and Israel 14. Carrots and Sticks: The Limits of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy 14.1. Militant Protagonists and International Opinion 14.2. The Context: British and American Interests 14.3. Carrots and Sticks: An Inventory 14.4. Anglo-American Cooperation 14.5. American and British Presumptions 14.6. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy 14.7. 'Arms and the Dam' 15. Documents