Having It Both Ways (eBook, PDF)

Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
Redaktion: Fletcher, Guy; Ridge, Michael

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism, where moral (and other normative) judgments are understood as representational or belief-like states, and pure non-cognitivism, where they are understood as non-representational or desire-like states. Rather, philosophers have adopted views which seek in some way to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. This collection of twelve new essays examines the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language. The papers, which focus mainly on moral thought and talk, provide a guide to this debate while also pushing it forward along numerous fronts.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 256
• Erscheinungstermin: 28. Oktober 2014
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780199347599
• Artikelnr.: 41660868

Autorenporträt

Guy Fletcher is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow and Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh. Michael Ridge is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.

Inhaltsangabe

* Contributors
* Introduction
* Part I
* 1. How to Insult a Philosopher
* Michael Ridge
* 2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics
* Daniel Boisvert
* 3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open
Questions and Moral Motivation
* David Copp
* 4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language:
Noncognitive Type-Generality
* Ryan Hay
* 5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism
* Jon Tresan
* 6. The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement
* Stephen Finlay
* 7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning.
* John Eriksson
* Part II
* 8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature
* Guy Fletcher
* 9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional
Implicature
* Stephen Barker
* 10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View?
* Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias
* 11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of
Normative Judgment
* Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter
* 12. Truth In Hybrid Semantics
* Mark Schroeder
* Bibliography
* Index